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Abstract 
Free and open trade is crucial for the European Union. Currently, the EU is the world’s 
largest trading bloc managing trade and investment relations with non-EU countries. 
The common commercial policy is the area of EU exclusive Competence. The 
Commission is responsible for legislation on trade matters, and for concluding 
international trade agreements. Despite this member states are not entirely excluded 
from trade negotiations. This thesis looks at negotiation process of the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) signed in 2016, with parts of 
it coming into force already in 2017. Using theoretical framework of liberal 
intergovernmentalism and principal-agent framework this thesis seeks to answer how, 
and to what extent, the large member states of the EU influence the negotiations of an 
international trade agreement.  CETA case proves that large member states can 
influence the area of EU exclusive competence. Member states have been involved in 
certain stages of the negotiation process. Moreover, the level of influence depends on 
the domestic situation, governments’ stances and national interests. 
 
Keywords: liberal intergovernmentalism; principal-agent framework; Canada; European 
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Introduction 
Free and open trade is crucial for the European Union. Openness has helped the 
EU to develop into the world’s largest trading bloc managing trade and investment 
relations with non-EU countries. The EU stresses that trade will remain an important 
engine of economic growth in the future. Because “90% of global economic growth will 
be generated outside the EU in the next 10 to 15 years, it is extremely important for 
Europe that global trade is not restricted” (Baartman and Meijnders, 2017). The 
numbers, actions and predictions confirm the importance of the trade area and how 
crucial policy area it is for the EU and its further development.    
 The common commercial policy is the area of EU exlusive Competence. 
Therefore, the Commission is responsible for legislation on trade matters, and for 
concluding international trade agreements. Despite this, member states are not entirely 
excluded from trade negotiations with non-EU countries. Trade negotiations are done in 
close cooperation and regular contact with the Council of the EU (the Council) and 
European Parliament who ultimately approve the overall agreement (The European 
Commission, 2012, p.3). As the Commission works on behalf of the EU, the concerns 
of the member states are taken into account. The Commission has to remain “fully 
accountable to the European civil society, the Member States and the European 
Parliament that exercise democratic control. The EU trade policy is created and 
implemented in a transparent and democratic manner to serve the European citizen, 
create jobs and ensure economic prosperity” (The European Commission, 2013, p.5). In 
sum, on one hand, trade negotiations are exclusive competence of the EU, which would 
mean full responsibility from the Commission, but on the other, the Council is still from 
the beginning and throughout involved in the negotiation process.   
 The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the level of influence of individual 
member states in EU common commercial policy. Specifically, this thesis will focus on 
the negotiation process of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) signed in 2016, with parts of it coming into force already in 2017. 
As a trade agreement between the EU and Canada, its main aim is to create jobs, growth 
and stimulate economic growth in general. Canada for Europe is a large market for 
export and country rich in natural resources that Europe needs. The agreement is 
comprehensive and, since it commits to promote labour rights, environmental protection 
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and sustainable development, progressive at the same time (The European Commission, 
2017). Thus CETA is beneficial for both sides. But throughout the negotiation process 
and even after when it had to be approved in national parliaments it has raised 
significant discussions and preference divergence between the Commission and the 
member states. For example, whether the agreement has to be finalized as ‘mixed’ or 
‘EU-only’ agreement, or making changes in certain clauses. CETA has been used as an 
example to explain and investigate other aspects of EU trade negotiation process.  Such 
as how democratic and transparent are EU negotiations, other actors such as civil 
society involvement in trade negotiations etc. So far the member state involvement has 
not yet been investigated. Thus, this thesis with CETA as a new case for EU trade 
policy will be a good example to investigate the involvement of member states in the 
EU’s exclusive competence.        
 The main research question of the thesis is – how, and to what extent, do the 
large member states of the EU influence the negotiations of an international trade 
agreement?      
The thesis focuses on six largest EU member states – Spain, Italy, Poland, 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom. Theoretically assuming that based on certain 
criteria these would be considered large member states, their influence would be greater 
in the process of CETA negotiations. The following four criteria are taken into account. 
First of all, they are economically bigger. Secondly, countries with larger population 
have greater influence upon voting in the EU. Thirdly, they are more effective in “side 
deal” making. Finally, large member states are more likely to be ready to use veto 
power in the  EU decisions. To answer the main research question, for this thesis there 
has been used qualitative content analysis. Empirical part is based on the liberal 
intergovernmentalism and supplemented by the principal-agent framework. These 
approaches give a framework for how states are involved in the decision-making 
process and what is the hierarchy between the actors. The analysis is based on EU 
official document analysis, voting results, country official statements, government 
reports, interviews (available in member state government, parliament, foreign ministry 
official webpages) and different media coverage.  It helps to see the actions of member 
states through all four stages - what were their preferences in CETA and what they do to 
achieve the desired results. In the end, with the use of all this material, it is possible to 
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ascertain and assess the influence of the member states in CETA negotiation process. 
For this thesis using CETA as a case study for a negotiated international trade 
agreement, member state influence will be analysed through four stages – the beginning 
of the negotiations; throughout; finalisation; and the period after finalisation. To answer 
the main research question, the following criteria will be analyzed for each country  – 
benefits of CETA; government, parliament, civil society support/opposition to CETA; 
turning points in a position change towards CETA; areas of dissatisfaction; result; 
ratification.  
The thesis has been divided into three parts. The first chapter provides an 
overview of liberal intergovernmentalism explaining what is the member state role in 
the EU and how they are involved in the decision-making process. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism has been supplemented with a principal-agent framework which 
explains the member state role as principal and the Commission as an agent in 
international trade negotiations. The second chapter lays out the methodology of this 
thesis. In third chapter of empirical analysis there has been investigated the member 
state involvement in CETA negotiations, starting with the overview on how EU 
negotiates trade agreements and overview of CETA negotiation process, followed by 
other actors such as Commission’s involvement in CETA, concluding with analysis and 
assessment of the involvement of Poland, Germany, Italy, France, the UK, Spain in 
CETA negotiations.   
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1. Liberal intergovernmentalism and EU trade agreements  
 
To investigate the level of influence of member states in the trade negotiation 
process, this thesis relies on theories of European integration which seek to explain how 
the EU has developed and reached its current form, as well as the role of that the 
member states play in the EU. Specifically, this thesis will rely on the theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism developed by Andrew Moravcsik in his book “The Choice for 
Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht” (Moravcsik, 
1998). Liberal intergovernmentalism looks at three phases of international negotiations 
– national preference formation, interstate bargaining, and institutional choice –, and the 
role of states in each stage. Liberal intergovernmentalism explains what opportunities 
states have to influence decision-making on the EU level. To supplement the idea of 
member state involvement, I will use the principal-agent framework which describes the 
member state role as principal and the Commission as an agent in international trade 
negotiations.  
 
1.1. Liberal intergovernmentalism 
 
Andrew Moravcsik’s research and teaching areas include European integration, 
transnational democracy, negotiation analysis, international relations theory, etc. His 
analytical history of the European Union “The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and 
State Power from Messina to Maastricht” is declared “the most important work in the 
field” by American Historical Review (Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs, 2018). The book helps to understand European integration, 
explaining “why sovereign governments in Europe have repeatedly chosen to coordinate 
their core economic policies and surrender sovereign prerogatives within an 
international institution” (Moravscik, 2018, p.1). The central claim is that “the broad 
lines of European integration since 1955 reflect three factors: patterns of commercial 
advantage, the relative bargaining power of important governments, and the incentives 
to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments” (Moravscik, 2018, p.3). In his 
book, Moravcsik has outlined an approach that explains the European integration. His 
main argument is that European integration can be explained as “a series of rational 
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choices made by national leaders” (Moravscik, 1998, p.18). He further analyses these 
choices through three phases of international negotiations – national preference 
formation, interstate bargaining, and institutional choice. The main aim of this thesis is 
to investigate the level of influence of individual member states in EU common 
commercial policy; liberal intergovernmentalism provides the theoretical framework for 
understanding how member states can influence international negotiations.  
Moravcsik’s ideas were developed under Stanley Hoffmann’s 
intergovernmentalism. Like Hoffmann, he criticises neo-functionalism, arguing that it 
failed to explain the evolution of the European Community (EC) itself (Bache and 
George, 2006, p.12). For Moravcsik, theories need to be supplemented by general 
theories of national responses to international interdependence; development of 
common policy responses needed to be looked at as much as institutional transfers of 
competence; only more than one theory can explain the complexity of the EC policy 
making (Bache and George, 2006,p.12). Further Moravscik stresses that the significant 
integration decisions are better explained with narrowed and more generalised theories 
of economic interests, bargaining, and institutional choice drawn from the general 
literature of international cooperation. Therefore, to structure this kind of inquiry he has 
used the rationalist framework of international cooperation (Moravscik, 1998, p.19). 
 As Moravscik explains, rationalist framework has proposed three stages of 
international negotiations and each level explaining with a different theory. At first, 
governments formulate a consistent set of national preferences. Preferences have been 
designated not merely as a particular set of policy goals, but as a set of underlying 
national objectives independent of any specific international negotiation to expand 
exports, to enhance security, or to realise some ideational goal. In the second stage, 
states develop strategies and bargain with one another to reach substantive agreements 
that realize those national preferences more efficiently than through unilateral actions. 
Last but not least states choose whether to delegate and pool sovereignty in international 
institutions that secure the substantive agreements they have made (Moravscik, 1998,p. 
20).   
Moravscik’s analysis concluded that choices were made on the national 
government preferences, not the supranational organization preferences. National 
preferences were a balance of economic interests, not the political biases or strategic 
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security concerns. The outcome of the negotiations depended on the relative bargaining 
power of the states (Bache and George, 2006, p.13). His research suggests that states are 
essential players in the negotiations and that the next stages are used to agree on the 
common ground under state preferences using supranational institutions. For this 
research on this basis, it is important to take into account the primary role of the states 
and broader picture how decisions are made on the EU level. Therefore further 
theoretical framework of this thesis will take a closer look at these three stages. 
The first stage in explaining the outcome of international negotiations is to set 
out the national preferences. Moravscik defines them as “an ordered and weighted set of 
values placed on future substantive outcomes (“states of the world”), that might result 
from international political interaction (Moravscik, 1998,p. 24). Furthermore, different 
substantial domestic actors are involved in preference formation, but states are the main 
actors that ensure consistent preference function. Other actors such as domestic social 
groups are using political institutions to pursue their interests, therefore, putting 
pressure on the governments (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, 69). For the trade 
negotiations it is especially important that the states are representing their interests in 
supranational level. Moreover, recent trade negotiations have shown that civil society 
groups can influence national governments and change the conditions of the 
agreements. At the same time, liberal intergovernmentalism states that preferences are 
not fixed or uninformed because they vary among states on different levels.  
 Furthermore, the preferences are ‘issue-specific’. Moravcsik’s research confirms 
that national government preferences reflected economic interests, as opposed to, for 
example, security concerns or European goals. At the same time, he notes that specific 
domestic sectoral and geopolitical interests can influence specific preference making 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, 70). Hence from the first phase, this research 
should show that that the EU member states have issue-specific interests, taking into 
account that different domestic actors have influenced them. On the next level states 
bring their preferences for the interstate bargaining.  
Liberal intergovernmentalism argues that preferences of states rarely coincide 
and to find common ground for the international cooperation bargaining theory has been 
used. Moravscik stresses that treaty-amending negotiations have to be treated as 
bargaining games over the precise terms of mutually beneficial cooperation (Moravscik, 
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1998, p.51). Thus on second level (bargaining) states have to find common ground on 
two aspects – coordination or cooperation for mutual benefit and how the mutual gains 
will be distributed between them. Hence the outcome of the international negotiations 
depends on the relative bargaining power of states (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 
2009, p.71).            
 In the EU context liberal intergovernmetalism argues that asymmetrical 
interdependence which is unequal benefit distribution from the agreement and general 
information about the preferences and agreement itself plays an essential role.  
Considering that, there is a chance that the actors that would not gain from the 
agreement would threaten others with non-cooperation and force for compromises for 
their interests. In addition to that, the actors that have more information about other 
preferences and the working structure of institutions can influence the outcome for their 
advantage. (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009,p.71).   
Therefore the bargaining level is essential for member states to secure their 
interests. Thus bargaining power is crucial. Theoretically, larger states ensure that their 
preferences have been taken into account because they have more resource 
opportunities. But at the same time, it can create more aggressive competition and 
debate between them. That is why the third level of institutional choice ensures the 
creation of credible commitments for member states, making sure that the national 
governments will stick to their side of the bargain.    
 Following neoliberal institutionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism argues that 
international institutions are necessary for maintaining a stable international 
cooperation. Moravscik argues that there are three explanations for delegation and why 
states pool their sovereignty. The first one is federalist ideology where support for 
delegation and pooling varies across the countries, not the issues. Second, there is a 
need for centralised, technocratic coordination, and planning. In this case, issues vary 
across the countries. Third, there is a desire for more credible commitments (Moravscik, 
1998, p. 68-69).  In overall international institutions are those who help states to reach a 
mutually beneficial outcome. Institutions help to reduce the transaction costs for 
international negotiations on specific issues and provide information about the other 
member state preferences, therefore reducing the uncertainty between them. Transferred 
sovereignty to institutions helps states to avoid the influence of domestic politics, and 
13 
 
decentralised intergovernmental control (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.72). 
Trade policy shows that institutional choice for the trade negotiation mandate has been 
given from the member states to the Commission. But at the same time, CETA has 
made a precedent by questioning the Commissions role and member state role – which 
are the exclusive and which are the shared competences between them.   
 On one hand liberal intergovernmentalism provides a framework for European 
integration and its decision making, but on the other hand, several field scholars have 
questioned the underlying theoretical assumptions of the liberal intergovernmentalism. 
One of the scholar groups agrees on Moravcsik’s rational choice and historical 
institutionalism rubrics, but they do not accept intergovernmental bargaining without 
institutions as an accurate description of the EU policy-making process. Moreover, 
scholars who are representing sociological institutionalism and constructivism do not 
comply with the methodological individualism of rational choice theory (Pollack, 2005, 
19).            
 For example, Leon Lindberg argues that part of the Moravcsik’s arguments can 
be used to strengthen certain neo-functionalist assumptions. He draws attention to the 
role of the supranational institutions and claims that Morvacsik’s empirical analysis on 
three stages of international negotiations can be used not only in reviewing the member 
states’, but also in understanding the Commission’s work. If Moravcsik’s analysis 
includes the socializing qualities of the intergovernmental institutions, then Lindberg 
draws an analogy between the “Commission’s ability to gain entrepreneurial advantage 
from diversity of preferences among member states on one hand and member state 
governments’ abilities to play off divided domestic interests on the other” (Rosamond, 
2000, 145).           
 An important argument has been laid out by Daniel Wincott. He claims that the 
liberal intergovernmentalism should be thaught as an approach rather than a theory. An 
argument has been justified with the fact that liberal intergovernmentalism does not 
have circumstances in which it can be empirically proven, and therefore main 
assumptions are not working, arguing that Moravcsik has only chosen certain sources 
for the explanation. Wincott has developed his approach, not through the emphasis on 
the role of the supranational institutions, but rather on the significance of the interaction 
between these institutions. He criticises liberal intergovernmentalism’s failure to 
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theorise policy feedbacks into the EU system which are the results of the previously 
made decisions, as well (Rosamond, 2000, 146). Thus it does not make liberal 
intergovernmentalism a deductive theory. Moravcsik himself has responded that liberal 
intergovernmentalism is a theoretically justified first step, but it does not mean that his 
approach cannot be used for the analysis of the everyday decisions (Rosamond, 2000, 
147). Morvcsik’s empirical research has shown that it can be used to explain the EU 
decision making process. Even if it does not follow the “label” of the theory it can be 
used as an approach for narrower or broader decision making explanation in the EU. 
Therefore for this thesis, it helps to find out how member states have influenced trade 
negotiations.         
 Furthermore, Moravcsik’s two-level game approach has been seen as too 
simplistic by some scholars. Scholars Smith and Ray have expanded the association 
between the two-level games and intergovernmentalism. Their analysis links the multi-
level governance – recognising unique bargaining environment in European institutions 
and the decisive role of the non-state actors in the integration results. Additionally, to 
Putnam’s two levels – international exchange and domestic politics – Smith, and Ray 
add extra three levels – institutionalised intergovernmental exchange; European 
Community – non-member government exchange; subnational exchange (Rosamond, 
2000, 147).           
 Smith and Ray have tried to make a much broader framework for the involved 
actors. The decisive role of non-state actors now in the EU trade negotiations is evident 
more and more, and it is important to take it into consideration. At the same time for the 
liberal intergovernmentalism, it can be seen at the first stage of national preference 
formation, where state governments are starting the process by formulating the 
preferences based on the public interests as well. Within two levels it can already be 
possible to expand the involved actors and their interests as it covers the international 
exchange where then can be explained the EU and non-member government exchange 
and domestic level with the subnational exchange.  
 One of the theories that challenge liberal intergovernmentalism is supranational 
governance. It came prominently in the 1990s developed by authors Wayne Sandholtz 
and Alec Stone Sweet. Supranational governance’s central argument, unlike the one of 
liberal intergovernmentalisms’, claims that as the EU develops it transforms from 
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intergovernmental arrangement to a supranational polity. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
have proposed a continuum that stretches between two modes of governance: the 
intergovernmental,  and the supranational. This continuum measures the movement 
from intergovernmental to supranational governance in three interrelated dimensions. 
First one, European Community (EC) rules that are legal and less formal behavioural 
restrictions produced by actions of political actors at the European level.  Second, EC 
organisations as government structures in European level producing, performing and 
interpreting EC rules. And transnational society as non-governmental actors who 
engage in EC processes and influence policy-making processes and outcomes at the 
European level (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997, p.304).  Moreover, they argue that 
member states are important, but intergovernmental bargaining and decision-making 
has changed in a way that it is embedded in processes that “are provoked and sustained 
by the expansion of transnational society, the pro-integrative activities of supranational 
organisations, and the growing density of supranational rules” (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz, 1997, p.300). Thus the capacity of member states to control outcomes 
reduces.           
 On one hand, supranational governance has offered a well-structured approach. 
Especially for this thesis both institutions and transnational society have to be taken into 
account. The Commission is the institution that negotiates the trade agreement on behalf 
of the EU with non-governmental actors being more involved as their interests have to 
be taken into account. And as further in this thesis can be seen governments take 
society’s interests into consideration for a position change. But on the other hand, the 
thesis aims to investigate the member state influence in trade negotiations. Thus liberal 
intergovernmentalism with the three stage international negotiations offers a better 
approach to look at the member state involvement. The thesis focuses on the narrowed 
process – the international negotiations – at first, and gradually moves through the 
preference setting stage where the non-governmental actors are involved, then to the 
bargaining stage, followed by a post-negotiation stage with institutions keeping the 
commitments of the governments.      
 Therefore liberal intergovernmentalism will be used as the main approach which 
is based on three phases of international negotiations – national preference formation, 
interstate bargaining, and institutional choice. First of all, the empirical analysis should 
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show that domestic preferences are economically driven. Secondly, in interstate 
bargaining, the countries with more resource power are more influential. Thirdly, 
institutions such as Commission are the ones that help the countries to keep the 
decisions of member states, gives more information on the issue and helps to avoid the 
influence from the domestic politics.   
 
1.2. Principal-agent framework and EU trade agreements 
 
According to the liberal intergovernmentalism, member states are the main 
actors and institutions are the ones that keep their credible commitments. To better 
explain this connection how member states delegate their powers to institutions 
principal-agent framework is used. Mark A. Pollack notes that rational choice 
institutionalists are those who have dedicated their research to the questions of 
“delegation to, and agency and agenda-setting by, supranational organisations such as 
the Commission” (Pollack, 2005, p. 376). Studies have addressed two specific sets of 
questions. First one, concerning why and under what conditions a group of member-
state principals might delegate powers to supranational agents, such as the Commission, 
the European Central Bank or the European Court of Justice. This question has been 
covered by Moravcsik (1998), Majone (1996), and Pollack (2003) research. They have 
drawn from the theoretical literature on delegation in American, comparative, and 
international politics. The results show “the motives of EU member governments in 
delegating specific powers and functions to the Commission and other supranational 
actors” (Pollack, 2005, p. 376). Whereas, the second question asks – “What if an agent 
such as the Commission, the ECJ, or the ECB behaves in ways that diverge from the 
preferences of the principals?” (Pollack, 2005, p.377).   
Consequentially rationalist studies show that principal-agent framework is based 
on the principle that member state delegates powers to supranational organisations. It is 
done to lower the transaction costs of policy-making; committing themselves to 
international agreements; to benefit from the supranational actor expertise on a 
particular issue (Pollack, 2005, p.376). Within the EU the power is mostly delegated to 
the Commission, the European Central Bank and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union or specialised agencies. The aim is to monitor member state compliance, how 
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they fulfil contracts, adopt implementing regulations that otherwise for the member 
states nationally would take a longer time (Pollack, 2005, 377). For this research, it is 
essential to use the principal-agent framework to analyse the interaction between the 
Commissions and the member states. It helps to answer the following questions: how 
much does the Commission possess; to what extent Commission is independent of 
member state decisions.  
The answer to the question on “what if an agent behaves in ways that diverge 
from the preferences of the principals” lies in the administrative procedures “that the 
principals may establish to define ex-ante the scope of agency activities, along with the 
procedures that allow for ex-post oversight and sanctioning of errant agents” (Pollack, 
2005, p.377). Furthermore, agency autonomy is more likely to vary across issue areas, 
based on the member states interests, exchange of the information between principals 
and agents, and decision rules that govern the application of sanctions or the adoption of 
new legislation (Pollack, 2005, p.377). But for the EU’s international trade negotiations, 
it has been concluded in analysis that the Commission enjoys independence in setting 
the EU trade policy, especially in international negotiations as a result of the delegation 
setting the agenda and negotiation conduct (Gstöhl and Bièvre, 2017,p.100). Trade is 
one of the economically important areas for the EU. Therefore, it could be said that 
member states would interact more. But at the same time, other research shows that in 
trade policy in international negotiations Commission enjoys more independence. 
Therefore theoretically this research should show that Commission enjoyed more 
independence from the member states while negotiating CETA, with the member states 
not involving persistently. 
  The important question is how to control the agent. When power is delegated to 
the Commission, member states have created committees of representatives. Rational 
choice analysts look at three committee groups - advisory, management, regulatory. The 
analysis shows that the Commission is least restricted under the advisory committee, but 
mostly restricted under the regulatory committee procedure. Making conclusion that 
influence of the Commission varies within the committees for the given issue area 
(Pollack, 2005, p.377). For the EU trade policy, there has been established Trade Policy 
Committee (TPC) of the member state representatives and the as well as for the 
Commission there is a requirement to report to the European Parliament's Committee on 
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International Trade (INTA) (Gstöhl and Bièvre, 2017,p. 104). The Commission is 
obliged to report to the TPC and INTA. Therefore, it is an interaction process, making 
sure that all interests are represented. Here already can be seen that in general the 
Commission has not been left alone during the negotiation process.   
 Interests can vary between actors, but if the interests are the same for the agent 
and the principal, then the agent is expected to implement the interests in line with the 
principals’ preferences. At the same time it has been noted that agent can dispose of 
certain advantages – more information or technical expertise – to pursue their interests 
(Gstöhl and Bièvre, 2017, p.103). For the trade sometimes it has been assumed that the 
Commission holds liberal preferences than member states. As the Commission can have 
more information on trade opportunities and trade partners, it can lead to ‘agency slack’ 
– “agent behaviour that is not in complete accordance with the principals’ preferences” 
(Gstöhl and Bièvre, 2017,p. 103).        
 This can happen because already within the member states there are different 
preferences, where some want specific sector liberalisation with the certain country, 
whereas others are preferring results that are closer to the status quo. There could be two 
forms of the agency slack – ‘shirking’ and ‘slippage’. Shirking occurs when agent 
internationally diverges from its mandate, but slippage when agent by accident “takes 
him off” from what the principal would want to implement as a policy (Gstöhl and 
Bièvre, 2017,p.103). It is an interesting aspect which will be overseen in the part of the 
“Actions of different actors in CETA negotiations.    
 Consequently, the principal-agent framework is used in this case to supplement 
the liberal intergovernmentalism’s three stages of decision making in international 
negotiations. In this case analysis will focus on relations and interactions between the 
Commission as an agent and member states as principal. This thesis will answer the 
following main questions: 
• how much independence the Commission enjoys from member states; 
• how and to what extent the member states have controlled 
Commission throughout the negotiation process; 
• if the interests of principal and agent vary is the Commission trying to 
diverge from its mandate;  
• how then member states control and influence that?  
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2. Methodology 
 
This chapter explains the methodological approach of this thesis. The chapter first 
examines the case selection on why the exact six largest member states – Germany, France, 
United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Poland – have been chosen for analysis. Then explains the 
structure how the influence of the member states will be ascertained in the empirical part.  
2.1. Case selection 
The research will focus on six largest member states of the EU – Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Poland. Officially there is no distinction in the 
EU dividing member states in large, medium and small sized states. But it can be seen 
that largest are Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and Poland; medium-
sized like - Netherlands, Romania and the Czech Republic; and small states with a 
population around five million or less (Keating et al. 2014). It clearly shows that the 
size of the population matters and it is one of the criteria that give larger states more 
influence in the EU than the smaller ones.        
 What is the reason the larger states has more influence on the EU? First of all, 
they have greater economic weight. Secondly, there is more voting power in the Council 
of the European Union, meaning that the qualified majority voting applies in almost all 
of the policy-making areas. A qualified majority requires 55% of member states vote in 
favour and support by member states representing at least 65% of the total EU 
population. Thirdly, states can more credibly exercise a veto in those cases where 
unanimity is required. Fourthly, large states can more easily make “side-deals” outside 
the formal decision-making process (Keating et al. 2014).    
 How does this then apply to the chosen six largest EU member states? The 
economic weight of each country could be determined by Eurostat data of 2017. The 
data shows that Germany leads the share in EU GDP with 21.3% making it the leading 
economy of the EU. The rest of the six contribute respectively: 14,9%, France; 11,2%, 
Italy; 7,6%, Spain; 15,2%, the UK; and 3%, Poland (Eurostat, 2018). Bigger resources 
can help to increase the influence, for example, in the case when more delegates can be 
present in the EU daily life. On one side, Poland can be seen as an exception for these 
criteria, as there are smaller countries with bigger GDP. But as one of the last members 
who joined the EU, it has shown how important actor it is, and it fulfils other criteria. 
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The size of population for the qualified majority voting is especially important when the 
decision is crucial, and member states can unite or divide for the final voting on the 
question. In terms of the share of population of the larger states, these member states 
have a great say because even if the small member states unite for the same vote and 
one or two are against, they can without no doubt block the question with their share of 
the vote. France accounts for 13.09 % of the population; Germany 16.10%; Italy 
11.95%; Spain 9.09%; the UK 12.85%; Poland 7.41% (The Council of the European 
Union, 2018). As it can be seen then together, these countries share more than a half of 
the whole population, so their voting is certainly crucial.  As regards to veto power, it is 
used quite seldom. No trade deal has been blocked by one or another country’s veto 
either. But one of the examples can be brought from 2011 when David Cameron Prime 
minister of the UK used his veto to block the revised Lisbon treaty (The Guardian, 
2011). Not going into details on the following consequences of this case, it can be seen, 
that first of all, it is possible to use veto power. Secondly, it was done by the UK, which 
is one of the biggest and influential member states and one of six looked upon in this 
thesis. The empirical part of this thesis will show that even the biggest countries unite to 
change the decisions of the Commission, and do so openly. Therefore there is no doubt 
that outside the formal decision-making process big states make “side-deals”. Taking 
into account all of these criteria, the six largest member states of the EU has been 
chosen to investigate how, and to what extent, do the large member states of the EU 
influence the negotiations.    
2.2. Ascertaining the influence of member states in international trade 
agreement negotiation  
 CETA was one of the most comprehensive agreements that the EU has ever 
negotiated. Therefore it has made a precedent for study case research from different 
angles. First of all, CETA has questioned EU’s trade policy in overall, especially what 
are and how big is each EU actors’ role. Secondly, what is the form of finalization of 
the agreement – “EU-only” or “mixed” (this will be covered in the empirical part)? 
Additionally as an agreement that has questioned the transparency of the negotiations 
questions; the exclusiveness of the Commission negotiating trade agreements; the 
involvement of other actors such as civil society and how they influence final decisions; 
new clauses such as Investor and state dispute settlement inclusion in agreement and its 
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consequences etc.         
 The time framework is based on the structure of how does the EU negotiate  the  
EU trade agreement? It shows all of the involved actors’ tasks in the negotiation 
process. Thus to better understand the whole structure of the process of negotiations it is 
analysed closer in the next chapter. But for the time framework, the most important 
stages are the following. The opening stage when the Council authorises the 
Commission to negotiate trade agreement on behalf of the EU.  Next stage when the 
Commission then negotiates with the partner country on behalf of the EU, in close 
cooperation with the Council and the Parliament. In the final stages, “after the European 
Parliament gives its consent, the Council adopts the decision to conclude the agreement. 
If the agreement covers topics of mixed responsibility, the Council can conclude it only 
after ratification by all member states” (The Council of European Union, 2017). 
Accordingly, for this thesis using CETA as a case study for a negotiated international 
trade agreement, member state influence will be analysed through four stages – the 
beginning of the negotiations; throughout; finalisation; and the period after finalisation. 
The time framework has not been limited to date when negotiations of CETA ended 
(2013), but extended to its finalisation (2016) and member state actions after it. 
Because, first of all, as it will be possible to see in subchapter on EU’s negotiation 
process, negotiation cycle ends when it is finalised, signed and ratified by all sides. 
Secondly, empirical analysis claims that even after negotiations have ended member 
states are frequently willing to make changes in the finalised agreement.  
  To ascertain the influence of the member states through these stages empirical 
analysis is based on document analysis, voting results, country official statements, 
government reports, interviews, media coverage. The overview of EU trade negotiations 
and CETA has mostly been based on the information prepared by Commission’s 
templates, official recommendation and a mandate with directives from the Commission 
to the Council. This overview provides an overall understanding of how EU negotiates 
trade agreements, and why CETA is an important agreement for the EU in addition to 
providing a basis for the time framework. The Council of the European Union 
“statements to the Council minutes” provides member state commentaries on the 
ongoing CETA negotiation process and what they agree on and what they wish to be 
changed in the agreement. Therefore after the finalisation of the deal, it is possible to 
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assess whether or not the request of the country has been taken into account, with the 
possibility to conclude if it has influenced the process. Moreover to provide the analysis 
of how and to what extent large member states influence CETA negotiations the 
assessment has been done through the use of largest member state national media and 
international media coverage, official webpages of local Parliaments, Foreign ministries 
and Governments. These sources present the country officials’ opinion; internal and 
international discussions with other countries; national parliament votes; proposals to 
the Commission; support and dissatisfaction on CETA in overall, specific clauses, 
issues. It helps to see the actions of member states through all four stages - what were 
their preferences in CETA and what they do to achieve the desired results. In the end, 
with the use of all this material, it is possible to ascertain and assess the influence of the 
member states in CETA negotiation process.      
 To better see the results assessment has been divided into eight categories: 
• benefits, 
• government support, 
• parliament support/opposition, 
• civil society support/opposition, 
• turning points in a position change, 
• areas of dissatisfaction, 
• result, 
• ratification. 
 The first category shows the main benefits from CETA for the member 
states. Second – whether the government support the deal at the beginning of the 
negotiations. The third – whether or not the Parliament supports the deal. Next category 
covers civil society position on the deal. “Turning points in a position change” discusses 
the possibility and occurrence of a domestic occasion which changed the position of the 
government. Therefore the sixth category covers specifically the areas of the agreement 
with what the government was not satisfied and desired to be changed. Then the 
category on result shows whether the desired changes have been made from the 
Commission side. Overall combination of the latter two categories shows the actual 
influence of the member states. Final category on ratification concludes whether the 
member state has ratified the agreement, or if not, is it going to ratify it explaining the 
reasons. 
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3. Negotiating the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade agreement  
 
Following the theoretical part to investigate the level of influence of member 
states in the CETA agreement negotiation process empirical analysis will contain five 
main parts. The overview of the process of how EU negotiates international trade 
agreements will give a look at negotiation steps and understanding at which stage 
member states are involved.  Overview on CETA will cover the main facts and dates of 
how the agreement was negotiated and concluded, including the aim and the benefits of 
the agreement. Commission’s work and another actors’ role within the negotiations and 
controversial turning points for the CETA will be covered in part of actions of different 
actors in CETA negotiations. Finally, analysis of the role of Poland, Germany, United 
Kingdom, Italy, France and Spain in CETA negotiations with an overall assessment if 
and how member states have influenced CETA agreement negotiation process, will be 
provided. 
 
3.1. The process of negotiating EU trade agreements 
The following table (Table 1) shows the process of how step by step EU is 
negotiating trade agreements. First two stages where Commission after given the 
recommendations to open negotiations receives a mandate from the Council (Table 1) 
characterises the principal-agent framework and liberal intergovernmentalism. Trade 
policy has been given to the EU as an exclusive competence, and the Commission as an 
institution keep the credible commitments, to negotiate on behalf of the whole Union. 
The following, third and fourth stages, respectively, “3. The Commission” and “4.The 
Commission” (Table 1) shows that Commission reports and consulting with other actors 
such as the Council, the EP, governments, etc., ensures that throughout the whole 
process all sides have been informed. I can be seen that the Commission is under a 
certain level of control and theoretically it could not evade the member states’ interests.  
The most important part is fifth step “Signing” (Table 1). With the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the Parliament’s role has grown, so the Commission is not only controlled and 
have to be in line with the member state interests but the Parliament as well has to be 
taken into account as at the end it has to give its consent. The situation of the Parliament 
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not being satisfied with the negotiated text and consequently failing to approve it, could 
ultimately lead to the trade negotiations failing. 
         
Table 1. The process of EU negotiating trade agreements. 
Actor Actions 
1. The Commission 
 
• assesses agreement's impact, public consultation on favourable 
outcomes, informal scoping exercise (what parties want to 
negotiate); 
• makes a recommendation to the Council to open negotiations and 
can also propose draft negotiating directives; 
• informs Parliament; 
• publishes online and send s negotiating directives  to the 
Council, Parliament, and EU national parliaments 
2.The Council 
 
• adopts a decision authorising the Commission to open 
negotiations; 
• decision can include non-binding negotiating directives to the 
Commission 
3. The Commission 
 
• Chief Negotiators set up the team, both sides agree on 
negotiation rounds; 
• After each negotiation round reports to the Council and the EP; 
• consults the Council's Trade Policy Committee (TPC) and the  
EP's  International Trade Committee (INTA). 
4. The Commission 
 
• throughout the process, national government ministers or the 
Parliament can initiate discussions 
• finalisation stage - informally final agreement texts have been 
sent to the Council and the Parliament and published online at the 
end of negotiations; 
• text goes for the legal revision making corrections and making 
sure that the agreement uses clear terms consistently throughout 
the text; offers legal certainty; 
• new text sent to the Commission. 
5. The Commission; the 
Council, the Parliament 
 
 
 
 
 
• Commission drafts the proposals for Council decisions on the 
signature, provisional application and conclusion; 
• proposals have been translated in all EU languages; sent to other 
Commission departments for review and comment; 
• the Council receives proposals and takes the decision to sign after 
it Commission proceeds with signing the agreement; 
• both sides formally sign the agreement; 
• after both sides sign, the Council examines the proposal for the 
conclusion and sends the agreement to the Parliament for its 
approval. 
Source: The European Commission, 2012.  
 
 The EU trade agreement finalisation is not part of Table 1. As it was a turning 
point in CETA negotiations, it is explained in more detail. The EU trade agreements are 
finalized as ‘EU-Only’ or ‘mixed’. ‘EU-only’ means that covered policy areas fall under 
the sole responsibility of the EU institutions, and ‘mixed’ when responsibility is shared 
between EU institutions and its member states. If the Parliament gives its consent in the 
case of ‘EU-only’ agreements, the EU can notify its consent to the depository, and the 
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agreement will enter into force once the other party notifies its ratification. For ‘mixed’ 
agreements, the EU requires the ratification of all EU member states. In the meantime, 
the EU can only apply the agreement provisionally – in full, or in part. After the 
ratification, the EU member states and the partner country notify the depositories of the 
agreement – the formal keepers of the final, signed texts. The Council adopts the 
decision to approve the agreement and publishes its decision to approve the agreement 
in the Official Journal of the EU. Once both parties ratify the agreement and tell the 
depositories that they have done so, the agreement fully enters into force (Commission, 
2012,p.6-7). For this thesis important is that CETA is an example that showed the 
choice for ‘EU-only’ or ‘mixed’ agreement. The type of the agreement is essential, first 
of all, because it shows the relevance of the Commission and if the trade policy is in the 
EU’s exclusive competence. Helps to explain to what extent does the EU is democratic 
and how much does the member states rely on their supranational bodies. Secondly, the 
length of the negotiation process and fear from the EU side that national parliaments 
would not ratify the agreement that Commission has negotiated for many years. The 
following two sections will, therefore, show both the general overview of CETA and 
how the process of its negotiations has developed to build a basis of understanding of 
how and to what extent  member states try to influence CETA negotiation process. 
3.2. Overview of CETA  
The EU and Canada have made one of the closest partnership throughout the 
years based on common values and shared interests in different fields. In 1976 the 
European Community and Canada concluded a Framework Commercial and Economic 
Agreement, and therefore in 2016 was marked already 40th anniversary of formal 
cooperation (EEAS, 2017). For now, already CETA has been entered into force 
provisionally, but the beginning of the close trade relations has been dated in 2002 
December when in Canada-EU summit in Ottawa joint statement was issued to form a 
wide-ranging bilateral trade and investment enhancement agreement. In 2004 both sides 
agreed to a framework for a Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement (TIEA), 
and voluntary framework for regulatory cooperation was adopted. The first round of the 
TIEA took place in Brussels in 2005, but in 2006 Canada and the EU jointly decided to 
suspend the negotiations (SICE, 2017).   
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After a more extended break, joint decision and conducted a study for assessing 
the costs and benefits of closer economic relations, both sides launched the negotiations 
on CETA on 6 May 2009. Before that after examining the recommendations of the 
Commission the Council on April 2009 “authorized the Commission to negotiate, on 
behalf of the European Community and its Member States, an Economic Integration 
Agreement with Canada, repealing the negotiating authorization adopted on 21-22 
December 2004 for the negotiation of a bilateral Trade and Investment Enhancement 
Agreement with Canada” (The Council of the European Union, 2009). The Table 2 
provides the main turning points and development of CETA negotiations. 
 
Table 2. The Timeline of CETA negotiations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SICE, 2017.   
 
A crucial turning point was in 2010 when the Commission submitted the 
recommendation for the modification of the negotiating mandate to include investment 
in the agreement, to use with investment protection paying more attention to investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) (The Council of the European Union, 2011). This is an 
important fact because as later analysis shows it was one of the most discussed and 
opposed clause of the whole agreement.      
  The primary question would be why such a comprehensive agreement was 
needed. In total the value of trade in goods in 2016 between the EU and Canada was 
64.3 billion euros, making the EU as Canada’s second biggest trading partner. Figure 1 
provides increasing trade flows from 2007-2017 between Canada and the EU. The top 
three categories of products exported to each other are machinery, transport equipment, 
chemical and pharmaceutical products. As regards to trade in services (transport, travel, 
Year Stage of the agreement 
2002 launch of TIEA 
2006 TIEA negotiations suspended 
2009 launch of CETA 
2010 modification of negotiation mandate 
2013 end of CETA negotiations 
2014 agreement on the final text 
2016 CETA proposed as ‘Mixed’agreement for 
signing 
2016 CETA signed from both sides 
2017 CETA approved by the EP 
2017 CETA enters into provisional application 
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insurance, communication), then between both sides, it amounted to 30.1 billion euros 
in 2015. The EU imported less than exported to Canada, raising export up to 5.1 billion 
euros (Commission, 2017). A significant amount of two-way export led to CETA 
creation. Thus the aim with CETA was to increase the two-way trade in goods and 
services in different areas and at the same time helping to create more jobs and to 
bolster both side economies. Table 3 includes the main benefits and areas that CETA 
covers. 
 
Figure 1. Total goods: EU Trade flows and balance, annual data 2007 – 2017. 
Source: The European Commission- Directorate-General for Trade,2018 
 
 
Table 3. Areas covered in CETA.   
CETA 
Main benefits 
• Abolishment of customs duties by 98%; 
• reduced trade barriers; 
• tariff elimination; 
• simplified customs procedures; 
• more compatible technical requirements; 
• opportunities for smaller EU firms; 
• makes EU exporters more competitive. 
Trade in goods 
• Already large export to Canada - machinery, chemical, food 
and drink products; 
• CETA will abolish customs duties and make the trading easier 
and cheaper. 
Trade in services 
• open up Canadian market in industries of financial services, 
postal and courier, telecommunications and transport.; 
• included Framework for professional services, to recognize 
each other’s qualifications in certain regulated professions – 
accountants, architects, engineers, lawyers.  
Public procurement 
 
• access to Canada’s large public procurement market; 
• creates opportunities for EU suppliers to bid for provincial and 
municipal contracts. 
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Investment 
• will encourage investment in both directions; 
• Investment Court System included. 
Intellectual 
property 
• improves the protection of intellectual property owned by EU 
individuals or companies. 
Sustainable 
Development 
chapter 
• legally binding commitments on environmental protection and 
respect for labour rights 
Protection of 
Sensitive EU 
products 
• Sensitive EU products - beef, pork, sweet corn (limited tariff-
free quotas) 
• Poultry and eggs are not opening its market. 
• 143 European products will have the status of Geographical 
Indications to be sold in Canada - gives them a similar level of 
protection from imitations as EU law does. 
Source: The European Commission, 2017 
    
The overall conclusion is that CETA is broad and comprehensive agreement. 
Both sides had to agree on details that for one or other are more important. For the EU it 
was hard to find common ground on food security, safety from GMOs, intellectual 
property and how to solve disputes. Therefore next section will provide the 
Commissions and another actor role in negotiations, including coordination and 
cooperation at the EU level.  
  
3.3. Actions of different actors in CETA negotiations   
 
Before assessing the role of large EU member states this part gives more insights 
on how Commission and other actors has influenced CETA negotiations.   
 As it was mentioned in the previous section on how the EU negotiates 
international trade agreements, the Commission was the main negotiator of the CETA, 
so it was involved throughout the whole negotiation process. At first, Canada and the 
EU finalised the Joint Study Assessing the Costs and Benefits of a Closer EU-Canada 
Economic Partnership in 2008 (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and DG 
Trade, 2008).  In 2009 Commission made a recommendation to the Council to open 
negotiations which after authorised the Commission to negotiate the trade agreement 
with Canada (Council of the EU, 2009).        
 Now the trade negotiation process has become more and more transparent, and 
negotiating directives have to be published at the time when the Commission receives 
the mandate. But in case of the CETA, it was different, because only after the Councils 
Continuation Table 3. 
CETA 
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decision in 2015 the directives were given to the Commission was declassified, and 
both 2009 and 2011 modified directives were made public (Council of the EU, 2015). 
This decision made it possible for the EU to be on “transparency track”. With all new 
trade agreements Commission publishes their mandates and summaries of the 
negotiation rounds and conclusions. But at the same time, it again questions the 
commitment to Commission and that the trade policy as an exclusive competence of the 
EU.  
In 2013 after months of negotiations between two main chief negotiators and 
their teams EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht and Canadian Trade Minister Ed Fast, 
the Commission President José Manuel Barroso and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper reached a political agreement on the key elements of the CETA. The political 
agreement meant that it could be proceeded with technical discussions and finalise the 
legal text of the agreement so that after the Council and Parliament could approve it 
(Commission, 2013). Until this time no “loud” opposition was made to an agreement, 
and the Commission did not see that it will have to change its nature of work.  
The EU and Canada concluded negotiations in 2014 with a reformed investment 
dispute settlement system, notably with full transparency of proceedings and clear and 
unambiguous investment protection standards. Following the legal revision of the text at 
the beginning of 2016, both sides announced that new approach to investment 
protection and investment dispute settlement (ISDS) had been included (Commission, 
2016). This decision has a broader impact because now all the new trade agreements 
have the ISDS type system inclusion.    
But the process to come to a one main ISDS system was not that easy. In 2014 
trade commissioner said that only small changes could be made to an investment 
protection clause. “The clause was disputed because it would allow companies to take 
cross-border legal action against governments. Malmström indicated that the 
Commission would make any changes in the most transparent way possible so that 
CETA can be successfully ratified by the member states” (Euractiv.de, 2014). It was 
further activated with the pressure from Germany, claiming that it would not sign the 
CETA unless the clause was scrapped, refusing to accept investment protection 
agreements in CETA and TTIP (Euractiv.de, 2014). One of the main risks if the clause 
was not amended was a possibility that the European Parliament would not vote in 
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favour of the agreement. The commissioner added that “By making the system work 
like an international court, these changes will ensure that citizens can trust it to deliver 
fair and objective judgments. We can confidently say that we’ve met the expectations of 
both the Member States and the European Parliament” (Vincenti, 2016).   
 From this, it can be concluded that Commission had negotiated CETA taking 
into account the interests and concerns of the member states and Parliament. 
Commission changed its initial position, because of the member state pressure and 
position that they would not sign the agreement if the ISDS clause would not be 
changed. It goes back to the principal-agent framework and CETA as an example which 
rejects the argument that Commission on the international negotiations has more 
independence, as well as showing that it is impossible to “go over” the given mandate.  
Throughout the negotiations, Commission and governments discussed CETA 
with the civil society. For example, in September 2016 the EU Trade Commissioner Ms 
Cecilia Malmström met with the Civil Society Dialogue to discuss and share 
stakeholders concerns and exchange views with Commissioner on CETA. The 
discussions continued despite the fact that already on 29 February 2016 the Commission 
and Canada announced the end of the legal review of the English version of this text. 
The legally reviewed text was made public on the same day, and since then translated in 
all official EU languages. It was done before it was adopted by Commission till 5 July 
and sent to the Council for formal signature (Commission, 2016). Then on 5 July 2016, 
the Commission formally proposed to the Council of the EU the signature and 
conclusion of CETA (Commission, 2016).  
At the same time before the proposal for the Council on signature and 
conclusion a discussion on what type of an agreement CETA is for the signing was 
raised. On 28 June 2016 “Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker reportedly told 
EU leaders that the Commission considers the CETA being an “EU-only” agreement 
and would propose next week (5 July) a simple approval procedure” (Vincenti, 2016). 
Theoretically, it would mean that it would be only adopted by the Parliament and 
representatives of the member states and not the national parliaments. But member 
states were against that especially concerns raised by Germany and France, stressing the 
importance of mixed agreement and national parliament say to maintain democratic 
control. Juncker was insisting that the Commission after detailed analysis had come to 
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the conclusion that CETA was not a mixed agreement, but if member states decide that 
the legal opinions are not valid, then he would not stay in their way. He added “I would 
like to see the clear legal proof that this is not an EU only competence. To say that it 
was my personal preference to make sure that national parliaments had no say in this is 
absurd” (Vincenti, 2016). The Commission argued that allowing national parliaments to 
have a say in the agreement would slow down the process and put the bloc’s credibility 
at stake. That would mean that ratifying could take a couple of years, as some countries 
said for them it would be difficult to ratify the agreement (Vincenti, 2016).  
 Commission on 5 July 2016 proposed the  agreement for the signature and 
conclusion to the Council, Commission announced that national parliaments would be 
included in the conclusion process. From Commission’s side, it was made as the 
compromise because the pressure from the member states was too high. Trade 
commissioner admitted that still, Commission considered it to fall under the exclusive 
competence of the EU. But the change of position was made due to the political 
situation in the Council and understanding on a need for mixed agreement to allow 
speedy agreement’s signature. And even more the decision by the Court of the EU over 
the legal status of the EU-Singapore free trade agreement should it be mixed, or shared 
agreement should set as a precedent for the decision on CETA to be a mixed agreement 
(Barbière, 2016). This is another important argument where CETA gives an example 
that member states are involved in the process of the agreement negotiations, and 
Commission are not independent and has to concede to member states. Of course, the 
agreement differs from other international trade agreements with its comprehensiveness, 
but at the same it does not simply allow to change the whole structure of the EU, 
meaning its division of competences. In the end, the role of the Commission has been 
undervalued and made unimportant as it cannot conclude the agreement itself.  
 After national parliament involvement, it did not help to speed the signature 
faster. Commission had to “accommodate” Belgian parliament preferences so that the 
deal would proceed further. The region of Wallonia wanted to veto the ratification on 
the premise that the agreement will not cover the interests of citizens and could damage 
EU agriculture. Commission President Juncker said that he is surprised that there was 
no objections when the EU concluded an agreement with Vietnam. But when the 
agreement is with Canada, country with the same values, the Commission is blamed for 
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not respecting the human and fundamental economic rights. (Valero, 2016). 
Commission expected that political weight of the leaders would change the opposition, 
but it was not influential. The Commission made all the possible steps for position 
change. Additional declarations to address concerns on GMOs, use of hormones in food 
products, and public procurement were added, as well as a separate paragraph on social 
security and insurance, one of the main concerns raised from the outset of the talks 
(Valero, 2016). The region did not accept it straight away only after a couple of days 
ratified the agreement so that on 30 October 2016 the agreement could be signed. The 
region of Wallonia was satisfied that their concerns were heard and they achieved what 
they requested (Eriksson, 2016). Thus the involvement of the national parliaments made 
the process longer and with more issues to solve. It proved that Commission has to find 
consensus with the member states for the finalization of the agreement.  
 On 30 October 2016 President of the European Commission Jean-Claude 
Juncker, President of the European Council Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of Slovakia 
Robert Fico, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau signed the CETA. After the 
signature, the Parliament had to give its consent so that CETA could enter into force 
provisionally. At the same time, there were still ongoing discussions on Investment 
Court System (ICS) as it was a new element in trade agreements. Commission 
supported its implementations only when all member states will conclude their national 
ratification procedures (Commission, 2016). And on 15 February 2017, the European 
Parliament voted in favour of the CETA, therefore, concluded the ratification process of 
this deal at the EU level (Commission, 2017). It can be said that only with the help and 
concession of the Commission to member states the CETA agreement has been ratified 
and approved by Parliament and now provisionally entered into a force.   
 The case of CETA shows that the exclusiveness of competence of the 
Commission to negotiate and conclude international trade agreements has started to 
evaporate. It is as a clear example that member states can influence the negotiation 
process in the direction which is more favorable for them. Moreover it is interesting that 
Commission cannot oppose and concedes even if it is its exclusive competence laid out 
in the foundation treaties.  
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3.4. Role of the member states in CETA negotiations 
 
 The following six subchapters present an analysis of the involvement of 
Poland, Germany, Italy, France, the UK, and Spain in CETA negotiations. The 
analysis covers eight categories – benefits of CETA; government, parliament, civil 
society support/opposition to CETA; turning points in a position change towards 
CETA; areas of dissatisfaction; results; ratification of CETA.  
 
 
3.4.1. Poland 
 
Throughout the years Poland and Canada through different cooperation formats 
have established a close partnership. In trade and investment when it comes to goods, 
Canada is Poland's 11th biggest trade partner outside the EU and 10th when it comes to 
services. The value of Poland's trade surplus in goods and services with Canada is 
around one billion euros. The value of Polish exports to Canada is 1.3 billion euros, and 
318 million euros is the value of Polish imports from Canada (Commission, 2017). The 
numbers and actual beneficial trading show that Poland will gain from the CETA 
agreement when tariffs will be reduced and Polish products more easily exported to 
Canada. Thus it could be expected that Poland would be in favour of the agreement 
showing more support than opposition.      
 The real situation shows that Poland’s support can be divided into two periods. 
The first one lasted throughout the negotiation process when it fully supported it 
knowing that Poland’s interests are satisfied; the second one started in 2017 when 
investment and state dispute settlement clause set up was not satisfactory for Poland. 
Already at the beginning of the 2014 Polish Deputy Minister Katarzyna Kacperczyk 
said that “Poland backs efforts to conclude CETA as soon as possible; the agreement is 
of key significance given the trade volume between the EU and Canada. It will also help 
strengthen Poland’s business and investment links with Canada” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Republic of Poland, 2014). She also stressed that with the help of CETA it 
will be easier for Polish entrepreneurs to do business, and mark their presence on the 
Canadian market on a much more broader scale than it was before, opportunity for both 
34 
 
business and science to develop research and innovation collaboration (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, 2014).   
Later in 2014, Deputy Minister Katarzyna Kacperczyk visited Canada for the 
economic mission. At that time it was important to expand Polish export markets as 
Russian embargo has harmed its economy. She argues that  “Sanctions and slow growth 
in Europe are accelerating Poland’s strategic push to diversify its export markets. Now 
we see a bigger appetite for non-European markets” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Republic of Poland, 2014). Therefore, Poland supports the CETA conclusion even more
 At the same time, it has been seen that Poland this cooperation will use as well 
as for the energy sector.  Deputy Minister Kacperczyk had stressed that: 
For the next few years, we will have a lot of investment in the energy sector. 
These are areas we want Canadian companies to be more active. Natural gas 
from Canada is a potential future source of supply for Poland’s new LNG 
import terminal in Swinoujscie (…). The project is vital to enhance energy 
security and increase Europe’s bargaining power with Russia’s Gazprom 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, 2014).    
Poland’s support continued as well as in 2016 when already the agreement came 
to a conclusion stage. Poland’s Foreign Minister stressed that “We decided that today 
there is no convincing argument for us not to conclude this deal” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Republic of Poland, 2016). He was convinced that previous government of 
Poland has made all the necessary efforts so that CETA meets the interests of Poland:   
CETA was negotiated by European commissioners in 2009-2014 when the PO-
PSL government was in power. If PSL believed that this agreement was badly 
negotiated or that bad conditions had been negotiated for Polish agriculture by 
2014, then they had five years to question and change these conditions (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, 2016). 
Moreover, Foreign minister of Poland saw CETA as cooperation with a member 
of the powerful military and political alliance which is notably important as Poland and 
Canada are part of NATO. Then he stressed that already agreement had mechanisms for 
dispute resolutions and was convinced that CETA would only be beneficial for all sides. 
Nevertheless, at the same time he questioned whether Poland would ratify the 
agreement:   
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Today this agreement is closed. It is being placed on the negotiation table – 
 either we accept it or not. We decided that today there are not convincing 
 arguments that would lead us not to conclude or join this agreement. But with 
 time, perhaps this situation will change. Even if its trade component enters into 
 force, a ratification process of this process will last a few years, and many 
 issues could be reversed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, 
 2016).   
On the one hand, showing the full support, but on the other leaving a sort of 
leverage to say everything still can change throughout the process.  
At that point, Polish Sejm approved the CETA legislation. Its decision stated: 
“for this agreement to be concluded and for its full entry into force, it is necessary to 
carry out procedures confirming its approval, in accordance with requirements and the 
internal legal order of the Member States of the EU” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Republic of Poland, 2016). Moreover, Poland’s further actions were followed by Sejm’s 
legislation: 
In accordance with the Polish constitutional order, commitment to the CETA 
agreement should occur by means of ratification prior consent granted by the 
statute because the agreement covers matters governed by laws or requiring a 
law. At the same time, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland holds the position that 
the subject of provisional application can only be provisions of the CETA 
agreement concerning matters that lie within the competence of the EU 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, 2016).  
During the decision-making process itself, oppositionists Nowoczesna Party and 
Civic Platform (PO) backed the ratification by Poland, conditions for the ratification 
posed by ruling party Law and Justice (PiS). But still, oppositionists Kukiz'15 and 
Polish People's Party (PSL) underscored the threats accompanying the CETA accord. At 
that time the ratification act was returned to the Sejm (lower house) EU affairs 
committee which authored it after PiS lodged an amendment making the ratification 
dependent on a qualified majority vote. Dominik Tarczynski (PiS) said the party would 
not ratify CETA if any of its conditions are not met. PO declared its support for the 
agreement and its temporary implementation until all the EU members ratified it. The 
PSL member Marcin Swiecicki stressed that CETA carried no threats to polish farmers. 
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Kukiz'15 questioned PiS's demand for a Pole on the CETA arbitration court, remarking 
that as a member of the bench the Pole “would cease to be a Pole” as his decisions 
would have to be objective. As well as According to PSL, CETA will be detrimental to 
Polish farmers and food quality. Party leader Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz suggested 
that the condition for its introduction should be its “full ratification” by the Polish 
parliament (Polish Press Agency, 2016). This was the first step when Poland 
domestically questioned Poland’s role in ISDS system. Thus it turned with this question 
in the EU level and it became as one of the main reasons why Poland would not ratify 
CETA. This can be linked to the foreign minister’s comments that there was still 
something that Poland can oppose if necessary. 
Another comment of minister supplements the Polish position. In 2016 claimed 
that Poland’s position on CETA is still taken under consideration as the final text of 
CETA has been received not long time ago, and the agreement is essential from the 
geopolitical and commercial point of view. He notes that there are areas that need to be 
carefully checked: “like issues regarding arbitration, legal problems concerning 
relations between corporations, state institutions and associations of employees. We 
would like to obtain additional clarifications, especially legal expert opinions” (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, 2016). Once more checking made the ground 
for Poland to put its demands for the Commission on the need for a Polish judge in 
ISDS system.   
Another claim was made by Polish Prime minister Beata Szydło who confirmed 
that generally government of Poland sees CETA as beneficial for Poland but has 
concerns with the investment arbitration, but the country will not ratify any deal which 
is unfavourable for Poland. “Any decisions about the EU-Canada trade deal must be 
ratified by a majority of two-thirds of the votes in the Polish parliament. The 
government will not agree to introduce solutions which would be unfavourable for 
Poland” (Polish Radio, 2016). It confirms the influential power of the national 
parliaments and threat for the non-ratification of the whole agreement, making the 
Commission powerless.  
On the Council, Poland expressed its views on 19 October 2016 meeting before 
the decision on the agreements conclusions. Poland pointed out that signature, 
provisional application and conclusion of CETA do not affect Poland’s decision 
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regarding the “scope of national competence, whose decision on concluding the 
agreement, in accordance with the principles and constitutional provisions, depends on 
completion of the internal ratification procedures” (The Council of the EU, 2016). 
Poland suggested its vision for the selections of the judges for Investment Court system 
judges:  
The Republic of Poland will seek to establish detailed rules for the selection of 
judges so that the composition of the court reflects the diversity of legal systems 
in the European Union and takes into account geographical balance among the 
EU Member States. An ideal solution would be a selection of a judge with a deep 
knowledge of the Polish legal system (The Council of the EU, 2016).  
Likewise, it declared consideration that there CETA covers all the regulation to 
protect human life, health, labour rules and standards, animal and food safety standards, 
protection and quality, environment protection etc., including in such sensitive areas as 
the effective control and the use of genetically modified organisms. “In relation to 
GMO, the Republic of Poland considers that CETA does not affect existing rules in the 
EU and guarantees the protection of the EU and Polish markets from the unwanted 
influx of genetically modified products” (Council of the EU, 2016). It convinced Poland 
that CETA will bring benefits for the EU and Poland while maintaining the EU 
standards. Through this Poland at the same time tried to cover satisfactory part of the 
agreement while bringing up its position and concrete preference what it wants in 
CETA. 
Following the opposition towards the selection of the judges in September 2017 
Poland threatened to block part of the CETA because of the ISDS concerns. Poland was 
not satisfied with the ten-judge system (five judges from Canada, five from third 
countries) which in Poland’s mind could exclude Polish judge selection. “Poland wants 
clarity on how the EU judges on the panel will be assigned to cases, to ensure that the 
procedure is fair and does not favour particular countries” (Shotter and Brunsden, 
2017). Poland’s advisory group claimed that “Such a fundamental inequality in the 
system should not be accepted, for legal, political and financial reasons” (Shotter and 
Brunsden, 2017), by concluding that if concerns would not be addressed it will not be 
able to advise to ratify any of the EU and member states trade and investment 
agreements. Response to Poland’s preferences has been that Commission has received 
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them and has been working on them (Shotter and Brunsden, 2017).  So far there have 
been no major changes and as CETA agreement states: 
The CETA Joint Committee shall, upon the entry into force of this Agreement, 
appoint fifteen Members of the Tribunal. Five of the Members of the Tribunal 
shall be nationals of a Member State of the European Union, five shall be 
nationals of Canada11 and five shall be nationals of third countries. The CETA 
Joint Committee may decide to increase or to decrease the number of the 
members of the Tribunal by multiples of three (The European Commission, 
Article 8.27- Constitution of the Tribunal).  
In case of Poland, it has shown two sides of involvement in the CETA 
negotiation process. First of all, at the beginning, it saw the agreement as satisfactory 
beneficial and supported ongoing negotiations. It stated that it will help its economy as 
well as CETA as a way for cooperation with Canada in fields of energy and security. It 
can be said that with its support it helped to conclude the agreement. But at the same 
time, some of the statements from the Polish officials till the very end pointed out that if 
the agreement would not satisfy its interests it will not ratify it. One of the biggest 
demands from Poland to the Commission was a change of the judge selection for the 
ISDS. But in this case, it can be said that member state has not been influential because 
system was not changed. Poland has not ratified CETA yet.  
 
 
3.4.2. Germany  
 
As with all the other large EU countries, Germany and Canada already have a 
close trading relationship and as predicted CETA will give it a big boost. Germany's 
share of GDP that depends on exports is the 2nd highest in the world. The share of 
Germany's economy that depends on exports is 47%, and it is the 2nd highest in the 
world. Data shows that in goods Canada is Germany's 15th biggest trade partner outside 
the EU and 5th in services. From Germany around 10’500 companies export to Canada 
of which 73% are small and medium-sized enterprises (Commission, 2017). In 
Germany’s case, a large percentage of companies are small and medium-sized therefore 
CETA is both – making benefits and big opposition. This is one of the reasons why 
Germany could pay more attention to an overall agreement – to safeguard interests of 
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companies.          
 Within one of her visits in Canada in 2016, Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed 
that the CETA offers major advantages for Europe, particularly for Germany as an 
exporting nation. Therefore stressing that Germany will encourage the Commission to 
come to a swift conclusion (The Federal Government, 2015). But in overall throughout 
the negotiations, Germany had shown both support and opposition towards agreement, 
and even for a while being neutral and not expressing their further actions.  
 For example, it was in 2014 when German Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel 
announced that Germany will not sign CETA “unless an investment protection clause 
allowing companies to take cross-border legal action against governments is scrapped” 
(Euractiv Network, 2014). At the same time in the same year 2014 When in the news 
came out that Germany is planning to reject CETA if the agreement contains ISDS, 
Ministry of Economics claimed that they are waiting for the final text of the agreement 
to meticulously examine the agreement, make conclusions and have their final position 
(Siekierski, 2014), therefore being  cautious on commenting their position.  
 Despite the criticism towards ISDS from Germany and claim that it will not 
allow to include ISDS clauses in any EU trade agreements, in 2014 German minister of 
economics Sigmar Gabriel said that country will not stand in the way of ratification. 
From the beginning, he and his represented party Social Democratic Party (SDP) was 
against the ISDS form, but it was the first move towards the support for the whole 
agreement, knowing that it would not be possible to drop the ISDS clause from the 
agreement (The Council of Canadians, 2014).      
 Once more question on the ISDS was opened in 2015 when even negotiations 
were completed Germany together with France joined together to change ISDS clause. 
French Secretary of State for Foreign Trade Matthias Fekl together with German 
Minister of Economy Sigmar Gabriel and Matthias Machnig Federal Secretary for 
Economic Affairs made a joint statement calling on the Commission and the Member 
States to consider “all options changes” of ISDS clause (The Council of Canadians, 
2015). But in 2016 German government confirmed that it is strengthening the 
transatlantic partnership and expanding free trade by supporting CETA and decided that 
Germany will sign CETA. Along with it noted that the German Bundestag debated 
CETA, and came out in favor of signing the agreement and of its provisional 
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application, but with recommendations for modifications. For example,  arrangements 
relating to CETA ought to be enshrined in legally binding declarations. The government 
claims it has acted on it with result that EU Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia 
Malmström, and Canada’s Minister of International Trade, Chrystia Freeland, expressed 
their readiness to agree on further clarifications (The Federal Government, 2016).  
 One of the confirmations for this was when Jürgen Hardt, Member of the 
Bundestag and Coordinator of Transatlantic Cooperation, issued a statement after the 
conclusion of the legal review of CETA was announced. He claimed that during the 
legal review key amendments to ISDS were agreed upon and was possible to 
incorporate the demands of the EP and many EU member states. Hardt stressed that the 
further work has to be done so that that the final signing and ratification of the CETA 
would take place as fast as possible (Federal Foreign Office, 2016).   
 In 2016 Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in his article once more 
stressed the importance of CETA. Not only economic benefits but as well as 
opportunity to develop free trade in accordance with their values. He expressed his 
gratitude to Sigmar Gabriel and the Social Democrats in Europe that “negotiations were 
re-opened on an agreement that had been done and dusted when he took office, and key 
improvements made” (Federal Foreign Office, 2016). Pointing out that Gabriel 
convinced the Commission, other member states and the Canadian Government of the 
need for a modern and transparent investment protection mechanism (Federal Foreign 
Office, 2016).          
 The question, where Germany secured its interests and position, was the 
termination of the provisional application of CETA which was brought by Germany to 
the Council together with Austria. Countries declared that “as Parties to CETA they can 
exercise their rights which derive from Article 30.7(3)(c) of CETA” (Council of the 
European Union, 2016, p.10). Their statement was taken into account. The Council 
acknowledged that ruling of a constitutional court on provisional application of CETA 
will be taken into account. If the ruling is against CETA then the provisional application 
must be and will be terminated (Council of the European Union, 2016, p.10).  
 Once more Germany was vocal when discussion on CETA as ‘EU-
only’/’mixed’ agreement arose. Germany was one of the first countries that started to 
point out the problem of CETA as EU-only agreement. It was the German Federal 
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Ministry of Economics which in September 2014 published its legal opinion on CETA 
and concluded that it should follow the mixed agreement (Hübner, Deman, and Balik, 
2017, p.851). As the previous section on Commission involvement showed 
Commission’s stance was that CETA has to be EU-only agreement. Therefore Germany 
together with Austria and France made an “intervention” to make the Commission 
retreat from such a position (Hübner, Deman, and Balik, 2017,p 851). German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the Commission can be overruled by the Council 
and that for Germany the opinion, in any case, will be asked from the Bundestag. She 
stressed that she favored a mixed agreement whereby national parliaments have a say 
(Vincenti, 2016). This action clearly showed how member states overtake control of 
exclusive competence of the EU.         
 As regards to the domestic opposition then in Germany biggest opposition to the 
agreement came from the Green party. In 2017 its leader Elizabeth May stressed that 
“investor-state provisions in CETA and other trade deals disproportionately benefit 
corporations and agreement is only about “giving power to the powerful and more 
money to the “monied”  not taking into account interests of citizens” (Radio Canada 
International, 2017).          
 Also, in Germany, there were large  protests from the citizens, especially from 
the farmers. Before the agreement went to the conclusion phase (September 2016) 
German citizens protested against the adoption of CETA. Around 320’000 citizens 
called on the Social Democratic Party to decline their support for CETA approval in a 
party convention and calling for a trade policy more fair to small and medium-sized 
farmers (Intellectual Property Watch, 2016).  One of the reasons why the opposition 
towards CETA rose has been well explained by German Minister of State for Europe 
Michael Roth when he visited Canada. He admitted that there has not been done enough 
to explain how trade and welfare actually go hand in hand; negotiations should not have 
been that secret; politicians had to be more vocal in saying that the answer to fears is not 
to close the door on the rest of the world and stop developing (Federal Foreign Office, 
2016).            
 The opposition grew so far that the case was brought to the German Court 
because opponents of the agreement (such as rights groups Campact, Foodwatch and 
More Democracy) feared that CETA will undermine workers’ rights and environmental 
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and consumer standards. Thus they collected about 190’000 signatures in support of 
their complaint and argued the deal would subvert the German constitution because it 
did not leave room for parliamentarians to interpret the agreement or vote against it 
(Deutsche Welle, 2016). But The Court backed German government for the signing and 
implementation of CETA, Court made a statement that “The Second Senate of the 
Constitutional Court has established that the German government has implemented the 
requirements set by the Court before endorsing the agreements on the signing and initial 
implementation of CETA” (Morgan, 2017).       
 Moreover, it was almost clear that Germany will be supported in full the 
agreement when major German party SDP decided to support the deal. It was important 
because if the support does not come from SDP then Germany would likely not ratify 
CETA. Two-thirds of the 235 party delegates voted in favor of CETA, but party noted 
that “red lines” have to be negotiated, such as sanctions for labor and environmental 
violations. The party decided to only ratify CETA if the details are clarified through a 
consultation process involving the parliament and social groups (Financial Post, 2016).   
The involvement of Germany in CETA negotiations can be seen when the 
agreement was approved by the EU and prime minister of Canada Justin Trudeau and 
Angela Merkel held a press conference after it and Canadian prime minister thanked 
Merkel for help. This time pointing out the role of country’s leadership Trudeau 
thanked Merkel “for her steadfast leadership and support during negotiations and said 
he hoped he could create a “stronger” relationship with Germany for years to come” 
(Perring, 2017). Of course, this can be called as a political move or “nice gesture”, but it 
shows that not only the Commission but member state leaders’ role in CETA 
negotiations are important, especially when the deal has to be finished.    
 Throughout the negotiations, Germany showed both support and opposition 
towards agreement, and even for a while being neutral. At the beginning of the 
negotiations and throughout German government supported the agreement as economic 
interests was at stake. Biggest parties in the Parliament from opposition changed its 
position to support. One of the reasons why Germany changed its position before CETA 
finalization was strong opposition from the civil society. But government saw ISDS 
clause and CETA being an ‘EU-only’ agreement as the major issues. Therefore together 
with France and support from other countries Germany made a proposal for changes. In 
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the result ISDS clause was clarified and CETA finalized as ‘mixed’ agreement. So far 
Germany has not ratified the full agreement.   
3.4.3. Spain 
 
For Spain, throughout the CETA negotiation process, there has been a division 
of sides. One side of Spanish people who are angered and claim that government has 
sold them out. On the other side supporters saying that CETA will create new 
opportunities for EU companies after tariffs will be reduced and could, therefore, boost 
trade and investment (Mansfield and Ortega, 2017). When holding joint official 
meetings Spain’s officials expressed their support for it. For example, in 2016 when 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Alfonso Dastis met Canadian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Stéphane Dion discussing not only security issues but also the economy, 
CETA for both sides was seen as beneficial. Claiming that Spain would like to see come 
into force as soon as possible, albeit provisionally. Ministers observed the successful 
cooperation in the infrastructure and energy sectors, as well as Canadian companies 
operating in Spain, with CETA help to deepen this cooperation (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation of Spain, 2016). 
As numbers from the EU report shows then Spain and Canada already have a 
close trading relationship and CETA agreement will increase it. Canada is Spain's 20th 
biggest trade partner outside the EU. The value of Spain's trade surplus with Canada is 
500 million EUR. The value of Spanish exports to Canada is 1.4 billion EUR. And the 
value of Spanish imports from Canada is 900 million EUR. There are around 5500 
companies that export to Canada and with CETA it will help them to do it easier, 
especially for small and medium-sized enterprises that are 91% of all companies 
(European Commission, 2017).   
The important aspect is that Canada sees Spain as an important trading partner. 
Mostly it is because of already made good trade relations. Spain is Canada’s seventh 
destination in the EU for merchandise exports; eighth largest for direct investment; fifth 
largest EU source of direct investment in Canada. In overall Canada values that Spain is 
a fifth largest economy in the EU and stresses the importance that Spain’s government 
encourages free trade and investment, and has been especially supportive of CETA. For 
further cooperation field, Canada sees Spanish information and technology sector which 
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is developing and where could remarkably benefit Canadian investors (The Canadian 
Trade Commissioner Service, 2017). 
Despite the potential benefits of the agreement Spanish activists took the streets 
to protest against the agreement and calling Spanish government to block CETA. 
Protesters were not convinced that CETA would positively affect their country they fear 
that agreement will harm the environment, labour, and consumer standards. One of the 
protestors in Madrid said: “We are here because we want to stop CETA. CETA is a 
trade deal that is against democracy, against people, against the rights of the working 
class, and we don’t want the Spanish government to ratify it” (Robinson, 2017). Other 
demonstrators held placards reading “Democracy and public services are not sold but 
defended and against Europe of inequalities” (Robinson, 2017).  
The domestic disagreement started when party Unidos Podemos (United We 
Can) wanted to suspend the debate on congressional approval of CETA and send the 
matter to Spain’s Constitutional Court for review (18 May 2017). But Spain’s Congress 
of Deputies rejected this motion, thereby making almost certain that Spain will ratify 
the treaty. By Partido Popular, Socialist party, Ciudadanos,  Partido Nacionalista Vasco, 
Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català in a 258-86 vote motion was blocked.  As well as a 
proposed motion by Unidos Podemos to amend the treaty was blocked by a vote of 262-
81, with one abstention (Progressive Spain, 2017).  
Not only party Unidos Podemos was not satisfied with the agreement. Before the 
vote on ratification on behalf of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) its 
president, Cristina Narbona announced that party’s position has changed and socialist 
deputies will not support CETA in voting at the plenary of the Congress. At the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Congress PSOE voted in favor of the CETA, where voting 
concluded with 28 votes in favor and 8 against (The Diplomat in Spain, 2017). Narbona 
pointed out that PSOE will not support it and that supporting CETA is not left-wing, 
and previous support being a big mistake, “International agreements have to be 
redefined to avoid concentrating more power on big corporations at the expense of 
rights” (The Diplomat in Spain, 2017). At the same time, PSOE president did not say 
whether PSOE will vote against or abstain. At that point, it could turn out that if PSOE 
aligns with Podemos and ECR parties then voting can be really tight relying on small 
parties and turned to be not in favor of ratification (The Diplomat in Spain, 2017).  
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  After PSOE announcement Spain’s Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy criticized 
their decision to withdraw support for CETA and expressed concern that his minority 
government might struggle to ratify the agreement in parliament. Rajoy said that he 
believes that PSOE decision is an error, and that treaty is enormously positive. He 
called the PSOE to use common sense, insisting the move would be damaging to both 
Spain and the Socialists: “We supported it and so has PSOE, all European governments 
support it (..) It cannot be Spain that vetoes it" (Agencia EFE, 2017). Rajoy’s stands 
were clear that he wanted to ratify the agreement whatever it takes: “If PSOE and 
Podemos do not vote for it, I will try to find deals with others” (Agencia EFE, 2017). 
Not only the Prime Minister criticized PSOE decision, so had secretary-general of 
Citizens Miguel Gutiérrez and Spain's Foreign Minister Alfonso Dastis who accused 
PSOE of becoming populist and warned against economic protectionism (Agencia EFE, 
2017). 
When it came to the ratification in the country in Spanish lower chamber’s 
plenary CETA was ratified with 179 votes in favor, 79 against and 81 abstentions. The 
threshold for surpassing was 176 votes for a simple majority, 179 coming from 
conservative Popular Party, the business-friendly Ciudadanos (“Citizens”) and the 
center-right regional Basque Nationalist Party and Democratic Party of Catalonia that 
all voted in favor of ratification. Abstentions came from the Spanish Socialist Workers' 
Party (PSOE). They abstained “as “warning” in light of the “new European framework” 
in which it was necessary to review some international treaties with the aim of 
achieving a fairer global trade” (Agencia EFE, 2017).  Party’s leader Pedro Sanchez 
before that in his primaries was on a position in favor of trade, but with conditions such 
as any deals needed to defend public services and guarantee social and labor rights, 
consumer and environmental protection (Agencia EFE, 2017).  PSOE’s statement for 
this vote: “social democratic left wing is not against international trade but wants it in 
conditions and regulations that ensure the universalization of rights and sensitive 
sectoral protections in each case” (Mansfield and Ortega, 2017).  
After this vote, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría Spain’s deputy prime minister 
criticized PSOE’s abstention and said it was an anti-European position. To this agreed 
Ciudadanos party leader Albert Rivera who claimed that PSOE’s position aligns with 
French politician Marine Le Pen’s rejection of free trade. But there were not only 
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abstentions or votes in favor but as well as votes against. Pablo Bustinduy  the foreign 
affairs spokesman for the left-wing coalition Unidos Podemos claimed that votes in 
favor and CETA is against the people’s sovereignty –  “agreement did not take the 
public interest into account and described the treaty's approval process as “defective” 
and “full of vices””(Agencia EFE, 2017).       
 As Spain sees CETA an economically beneficial agreement then government 
expressed its support throughout the negotiations. Spain had strong civil society and 
even Parliament opposition. Nevertheless it kept its support throughout the negotiations, 
did not express dissatisfaction with any parts of the agreement, and in the 2017 ratified 
CETA. 
 
 
3.4.4. The United Kingdom 
 
In numbers around 10’000 British companies export to Canada, of which 79% 
are small and medium-sized enterprises. In goods and services, Canada is UK’s 5th 
biggest trade partner outside the EU. Value of British exports to Canada is 9 billion 
EUR whereas the value of British imports from Canada is 14 billion EUR (Commission, 
2017), therefore with help of CETA boosting trade relations with Canada. The UK 
government points out then UK businesses will take immediate advantage of the tariff 
removal, benefiting across multiple sectors such as food, drink, manufacturing and 
construction. As the UK is leaving the EU then its government has committed to 
seeking continuity in trade and investment relationships with third countries as the UK 
exits the EU (Government of the United Kingdom, 2017).     
  Since the beginning, the UK government has supported CETA. Already at the 
beginning of the CETA negotiations in 2011 within one of the meetings with Canadian 
officials Foreign Secretary at that time William Hague confirmed UK’s support and 
welcomed Canadian one: “The UK strongly supports the conclusion of the CETA and 
we hope that the negotiations will make good progress at the next round” (Government 
of the United Kingdom, 2011). Further in 2014 during Trade Minister’s Lord 
Livingston visit to Canada support was reassured: “We have a strong trade and 
investment relationship with Canada which I am determined to build on. The 
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important CETA agreement has real potential to create growth and jobs in both 
countries and I look forward to its speedy conclusion” (Government of the United 
Kingdom, 2014). Another aspect where the UK had consensus with other member states 
was CETA being as a “mixed” agreement.  It was the UK’s view that CETA consists of 
both EU and member state competence (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2016). 
 So far in the UK process with CETA has been debated in the House of 
Commons European Committee B on February 2017 but not on the Floor of the House 
as the European Scrutiny Committee had recommended. The House of Commons 
International Trade Committee has also taken evidence on CETA (Dominic Webb, 
2017,p.3). Already in 2016 the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee 
recommended that there be an early debate on CETA on the Floor of the House more to 
discuss the complex legal and policy issues for the UK before and after Brexit; public 
inovelement and opposition; need for more transparency in trade negotiations and their 
conclusion to ensure their democratic legitimacy; pointing out that debate on CETA 
would provide opportunity for the House of Commons as a whole to scrutinise and have 
a say on the Government’s position on CETA before it is signed and then implemented 
(Dominic Webb, 2017,p.16).        
 Furthermore in June 2016 House members proposed a motion stressing that 
there was a lack of parliamentary and public debate around CETA, especially no debate 
in the House before provisional implementation. As well as at that time they were not 
satisfied with the fact that it was not clear whether CETA is a mixed or sole competence 
agreement, and June can be the last month when actual debates can happen to change 
something. Important point was that the House members called on the Prime Minister to 
oppose provisional implementation at the EU Council in June, if necessary by opposing 
the whole deal unless a ratification vote is guaranteed in the House before any 
implementation takes place (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2016).  
 At that point situation only internally worsen because Secretary of State for 
International Trade Liam Fox did not give chance to Parliament to debate on CETA 
before the Council expected to agree on its implementation. Thus he had to appear 
before the European Scrutiny Committee and give the evidence to justify the lack of a 
debate on CETA before its agreement; set out the Government’s intended approach to 
facilitating public and parliamentary scrutiny of trade deals; explain its implications for 
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the UK trade deals, before and after Brexit (Global Justice, 2016). The problem was that 
there were requests from to Parliament to have a debate on this issue, but Liam Fox did 
not take them into account. During the parliamentary scrutiny, he apologized and said 
that it was important so that it did not look like the UK was blocking the agreement and 
potentially jeopardizing potential trade deals with the EU and Canada after Brexit. Fox 
promised to have the scrutiny of the trade deal, but critics argue that nevertheless 
already some parts will be already into force and then Parliament cannot influence 
agreement that has been already into force (Global Justice, 2016).   
 Parliamentarians believed that government has not done enough to defend 
interests of the UK. Within one of the Parliamentary debates one of the questions was 
on National Health Service protection, parliamentarian Barry Gardiner asked minister to 
explain “why the German Government and other Governments saw fit to protect their 
health services in their entirety, while the British Government felt the need to protect 
private ambulance services by listing them in the annexe, but not the health service as a 
whole” (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2017). Minister replied that this was not 
necessary to put it in the agreement specifically, ensuring that public interests have been 
safeguarded anyways. Moreover, he rejected the accusation that the UK sacrificed key 
interests for EU-wide common position before starting CETA negotiations. At the same 
time pointing the fact CETA will not apply after UK leaves the EU and it will be 
possible to negotiate a new agreement with Canada (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
2017).            
 At the same time the same when vote on a Proposal for a Council Decision on 
the signing, provisional application and conclusion of CETA took place in House of 
Commons, the House was divided in 409 votes “for” and 126 “against”, thus the 
question was accordingly agreed to (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2017). 
Therefore interests of UK government were secured.     
  In the Parliament strongest opposition as it was in Germany’s case came from 
the Green party. Their main concern is the Investment Court System. Green party 
stresses that UK is “prominent cheerleader for CETA” and even more after UK’s 
referendum all parties are trying to seal the deal before the UK leaves. Party had 
welcomed the decision to give national parliaments a say with the ratification, saying 
that it had made the deal more democratic. But they condemned that the UK 
49 
 
government accepted the deal without submitting it to parliamentary scrutiny, not being 
like, for example, Belguim which fought for their interests (Taylor, 2016).  
 As the UK leaves the EU then one of the main concerns for UK government was 
about the court system of arbitration which is included in CETA. The last decision was 
that the investment court system (ICS) of arbitration will not be provisionally applied 
ahead of ratification in Member States. The UK welcomed this decision as removal of 
ICS from provisional application as the main ask of the UK Government (Parliament of 
the United Kingdom, 2016).         
 How CETA will work for the UK after its leaving of the EU has remained as 
most important question. Therefore minister of Trade and investment has claimed that 
for further conversations and when talking about opt-in decisions, they all will be made 
on a case-by-case basis, putting the national interest at the heart of the decision making 
process. As well as it was the same with provisional application with whole agreement 
where UK as Commission and other member states refused to apply agreement entirely 
after conclusion of negotiations (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2016).  
 Not only UK government want to make the ratification of CETA, but as well as 
the Canadian side. Taking into account that the UK will leave the EU and the UK is an 
important partner, the Canadian government has been pushing British government to 
ratify CETA before the UK leaves the EU.  One of the expert opinion says that “if the 
UK does not formally leave the European Union before CETA is ratified, then Article 
30.9 (2) of CETA would apply and the UK would be tied into the trade deal for a period 
of twenty years after announcing any intention to leave the deal” (The Council of 
Canadians, 2017).         
 Nevertheless on one of the last European Committee debates on CETA Minister 
for Trade and investment Greg Hands once more stressed that agreement is consistent 
with the UK’s objectives in trade policy and with relevant wider policy goals, as well as 
that support for CETA means that UK demonstrates to the world that it remains the 
strongest global advocate for free markets and free trade. Pointing out that Government 
looks forward to the successful passage of the CETA agreement in the European 
Parliament and the provisional application of the agreement. When talking about 
ratification then idea was to look at the parliamentary timetable and listen to the plans of 
other member states when deciding on a timetable for ratification in UK’s Parliament 
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(Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2017).      
 For the UK Brexit is current question to solve, it is one of the reasons why the 
UK has not being influential during the negotiation process. Even the UK parliament 
pointed out that the government has not done enough to defend the interests of the UK. 
Government has been decided on CETA on behalf of the country more independently 
than other countries. Agreement did not go through the parliamentary scrutiny before its 
finalization. It has supported the actions of the other member state but there has not 
been any straight forward influence. The UK government since the beginning has seen 
CETA as a beneficial agreement therefore its intention is the ratification of the 
agreement before the UK leaves the EU.  
 
3.4.5. Italy 
In numbers already around 13000 Italian companies export to Canada, of which 
79% are small and medium-sized enterprises. Canada is Italy’s 9th biggest trade partner 
outside the EU, making Italy’s trade surplus with Canada for 3.2 billion EUR. The value 
of Italian exports to Canada is 5.1 billion EUR, but imports making 1.9 billion EUR 
(European Commission, 2017). Moreover, Italy has identified Canada as a priority 
partner for sales, trading, and investment, seeing Canada as a partner in the field of 
information and technology. As a partner, Italy and Canada have established 
mechanisms that support commercial and people exchange, as well as joint research 
dealing with quality of life issues – health, environment, energy, new materials. 
Pointing out that Italy has been a strong supporter of enhanced economic partnership, 
especially being a proactive proponent of CETA conclusion which will boost the 
bilateral trade and investment (The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service, 2017). 
 In 2013 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the political agreement 
reached by the Commission and the Canadian Government on CETA. Ministry pointed 
out that CETA will increase economic and commercial opportunities as well as growth 
for the EU countries, Italy and Canada as an important transatlantic partner. The 
importance of the agreement was underscored by Prime Minister Enrico Letta and the 
Deputy Minister for Economic Development, Carlo Calenda (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, 2013).     
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 Carlo Calenda, Deputy Minister for economic development, at the end of the 
CETA negotiation process (2014) once more stressed the importance of the agreement 
and its benefits – elimination of duties on all industrial products, better access to 
Canadian markets for Italian companies, Canada as a growing country with resources 
and strong links with Italy. Also, the most significant benefit for Italy is protection of 
products. “An outstandingly important result for our country is the protection granted to 
PDO (Protected Designation of Origin) products that finally, after 40 years, will make it 
possible for e.g. Prosciutto di Parma and San Daniele to be marketed in Canada with 
their names” (Ministry of Economic Development of Italy, 2014).   
 An interesting aspect was when despite the internal opposition Italian 
government was the one which supported the Commission’s decision to finalize CETA 
as “EU only” agreement. In a letter of support to the EU commissioner for trade Cecilia 
Malmström, Carlo Calenda informed that Italy is ready to consider to support the 
Commission on CETA as “EU only” agreement (Moody, 2016).  The Undersecretary of 
State for Economic Development Ivan Scalfarotto explained government’s position on 
this stance stressing the that according to the Lisbon Treaty the EU has an exclusive 
competence over commercial policy and the practical outcome of EU only agreement:  
 Waiting for national ratifications, the provisional application that would take    
place would end up being very narrow as it would have to reflect different 
national sensitivities. Moreover, each national parliament alone could decide 
not to ratify and in such case, CETA would never enter into force (Italy's 
Diplomatic and Parliamentary Practice on International Law, 2016).  
After strong support for CETA within its negotiation years, now Italy has not 
expressed any current position on how they will proceed with CETA further. One of the 
reasons for that can be the fact that in 2017 agriculture and industry ministers of Italy 
signed a decree ordering the new labelling policy. The decree stated that “all packets of 
pasta and rice sold in Italy will have to include labels of origin showing where the 
produce was grown” (Euractiv.com, 2017). Industry Minister Carlo Calenda have said  
that most of the Italian consumers wanted to know the origin of their food and it was 
important to promote Italian farmers: “We want to emphasize the importance of ‘Made 
in Italy’ and the quality of our production in order to compete with greater strength in 
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international markets,” (Euractiv.com, 2017). Straight away concerns were raised from 
the Canadian side. Canadian government sought clarification from Italy and assessed 
Italy’s trade obligations under the WTO and CETA. At the same time, there was no 
indication that Italy’s decision has affected trade (Euractiv.com, 2017). So far there has 
not been any development for this case, as well as mentioned Italy’s current stance on 
CETA.           
 Since the beginning of the negotiations Italy has expressed its support to the 
agreement. Strong opposition from civil society and parliament was not observed.  Even 
though it was contented with the agreement and especially clause on the protection of 
essential products of Italy, it has changed its position after the finalization of the 
agreement. Currently government stresses the importance of the Italian producers 
therefore it has changed the labeling law. The change of the law has raised significant 
discussion in Canada and the EU as the rules of the CETA and WTO might be violated. 
But so far there has not been a solution. Italy has not ratified CETA yet.  
3.4.6.  France  
 
As France and Canada already have a close trading relationship with Canada 
being France's 15th biggest trading partner outside the EU it is expected that CETA will 
only help to grow this relationship.  There are around 10’000 French companies that 
export to Canada, and 79% of them are small and medium-sized enterprises. The value 
of France’s trade surplus with Canada is 621 million EUR. Whereas the value of French 
exports to Canada is 5 billion EUR and value of imports from Canada is 4.5 billion 
EUR (Commission, 2017). Not only economic ties have brought France to support 
CETA, but as well as historical connection with Canada. France with Canadian 
provinces has created an ongoing cultural exchange. It has been informed that “this 
relation was ‘instrumentalized’ also by the Quebec government in order to make a push 
in Canada for an agreement with the EU” (Hübner, Deman, and Balik, 2017, p.848).
 At the same time, CETA in France received critics. In 2014 French Parliament 
both houses adopted resolutions opposing the investment protection rules in CETA. But 
it had to be noted that resolutions were not binding on the French government, but they 
definitely reflected significant opposition to the controversial elements of CETA (The 
Council of Canadians, 2014). Parliament members acted further when in February more 
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than 100 members of the Parliament decided to appeal to the country’s Constitutional 
Council to block CETA. In their statement members said, “the accord implied a transfer 
of sovereignty by signatory countries “beyond what they agreed upon in favor of the 
EU”” (Gotev, 2017).          
 Previous research shows that Germany was clear on saying that it would veto 
ratification of CETA if it included an ISDS, while at that point in 2014 France remained 
reserved. Prime Minister Mathias Fekl pointed that France had never asked for ISDS in 
CETA. As France was hesitating to change ISDS clause in the agreement, Germany 
changed its position as well. Therefore German Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel 
stressed that “if the rest of Europe wants this agreement, then Germany has no choice 
but to approve” (Fabry, 2015, p.12). In 2015 Fekl changed the position of France 
against the inclusion of an ISDS in the final agreement, stating: “We will never agree to 
private jurisdiction called into play by multinational corporations deciding 
governments’ sovereign policies, especially not in such areas as health or the 
environment” (Fabry, 2015, p.12). As before outlined in this thesis Germany and France 
made possible to change the ISDS clause and now it is changed to Investment Court 
System.           
 The crucial turning point for CETA was French presidential elections. 
Supporters of CETA were satisfied with the outcome of the elections because 
Emmanuel Macron was the only presidential candidate who supported CETA. 
Lawrence Cannon, Canada’s ambassador to France, reported to Canada: “His 
(Macron’s) support for CETA is consistent with his pro-European and liberal political 
vision” (Export Development Canada, 2017). Although Macron supports trading and 
CETA, he has proposed changes in the EU’s trade policy. In order to distract the 
criticism, deal with the environmental consequences that CETA will have for France, 
Macron has proposed number of regulations. Some of the proposals are – strand of 
fiscal cooperation, social and environmental clauses. The proposals entail a promise to 
“establish a code of European social rights with minimum standards for training, health 
insurance, unemployment insurance and wages. Additionally, the creation of an 
environmental task force to probe the deal for its shortcomings” (Haverstock, 2017). So 
it cannot be said that France will not and cannot change the nature of the agreement. 
 After agreement’s conclusion in 2016 when French Prime Minister Manuel 
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Valls visited Canada, both Canada and France expressed support for CETA’s fast 
implementation and mutual cooperation in the promotion of the opportunities the 
agreement will create. Prime Minister stressed that CETA was “the best agreement 
concluded between the EU and another commercial power” (Gouvernement.fr, 2016).    
But due to the previous mentioned opposition and Macron’s ambitions for 
changes in October 2017 France announced an action plan on CETA’s environmental 
and health issues. French Government stated that “action plan demonstrates the 
Government’s determination to make sure that the CETA is applied in an exemplary 
fashion, to step up its actions against climate change, environmental, social, and health-
related aspects of European trade policy” (France Diplomatie, 2017). French Ecology 
Minister Nicolas Hulot said that “France is seeking “climate veto” powers over CETA 
to ensure to ensure it does not undermine efforts against global warming” (Barbière, 
2017).  Another problem area was raised from Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian on 
the security of key industries. He claimed that France “was seeking to be “exemplary” 
in its implementation of the deal, including monitoring its impact on key industries such 
as farming” (Barbière, 2017).        
 At the same time, there have been different views on “climate veto” even saying 
that it is an “empty government’s promise” because negotiations have been concluded 
and parts of CETA has already entered into force. It can be only possible to realize if the 
Commission, other member states, and Canada adhere to it. But Jean-Baptiste Lemoyne, 
French Secretary of State and President has that France, Commission, and Canada were 
“already in the process of developing a “Joint EU-Canada interpretative Declaration” 
(Barbière, 2017).         
 In October 2017 France announced that it would only ratify CETA as long as 
it makes sure that the trade deal does not affect policies and regulations addressing 
climate change (Climate Action, 2017). But already in 2018 after Canadian Prime 
Minister visit in France, the French president Emmanuel Macron offered “praise for 
CETA”, by backing it he as well as stressed that he looks forward to France ratifying 
the agreement (Waldie, 2018). And French Environment Minister Nicolas Hulot 
affirmed that French parliament is expected to ratify CETA around the second half of 
2018 (Reuters.com, 2017).          
 At the beginning of the negotiations, French government fully supported the 
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agreement. Despite the opposition of the Parliament, government supported the 
agreement till the finalisation process. Along with Germany, it proposed for changes in 
finalization as ‘EU-only’ agreement and ISDS clause. Influence has been observed as 
the Commission made clarifications of the ISDS clause and finalised CETA as ‘mixed’ 
agreement. The turning point for France was its presidential elections. Currently after 
the finalization of the agreement France has proposed an action plan on environmental 
issues for CETA. Therefore France continues to influence already finalized agreement. 
France is expected to ratify the agreement in 2018.  
3.5. Assessment  
To summarize the results of the member state involvement during and after CETA 
negotiation process, Table 4 on the following page (p50) combines all the key features 
related to this process. The conclusion is that all of the large member states’ 
governments saw economic benefits for their states in CETA at the beginning of the 
negotiation process. Since all the member states already have strong trading relations 
with Canada, CETA would boost and develop trading and economic relations for both 
sides. Small and medium-sized companies which are a large share of those who export 
to Canada would especially gain from the agreement. Only Poland has pointed out that 
CETA creates an opportunity to secure the energy sector.  The analysis showed that 
although the national governments had shown support for CETA and throughout the 
negotiations, all of the state leaders have expressed it through visits to Canada and 
official statements, the member state parliaments were divided in their positions. Of 
course, it can be said that as always in parliamentary debates, members are divided into 
coalition and opposition, thus having controversial debates. This was the case with 
CETA where coalitions were “for” and oppositions “against” the agreement. Taking 
into account that there was an opposition all the big member state Parliaments approved 
the agreement when it had to be finalized.       
 The most controversial debate and therefore strong opposition were in the case 
of UK. The agreement was not debated in the parliament until its finalization approval 
in the Council. Government signed without the consent of the parliament the provisional 
application of the agreement. Members of the UK Parliament had also pointed out that 
the UK government only supports the overall EU’s position and does not defend its 
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local interests and fails to change the clauses of the agreement like other countries 
do.Civil society opposition to CETA was strong. Significant protests have happened in 
all of the member states. The most concerns have been towards the quality of food 
products (GMOs), the fact that the higher standards of the EU will be lowered and 
environmental issues. Civil society did not affect the overall conclusion of the 
agreement. But all cases showed that when new proposal from the governments’ was on 
the table they referred to the interests of the citizens.   
 “Turning points in a position change”, as covered in Table 4, is crucial part as it 
shows in most cases a shift of position towards CETA. For Poland, it was 2016 when it 
stated that at that moment there are not enough convincing arguments for ratification. 
The government was not satisfied with the ISDS and after how the judges will be 
selected in the new ICS. As it was covered in the broader analysis of the previous 
section, ISDS was changed to the ICS due to proposals made by Germany and France. 
Poland ultimately supported the finalization of the agreement, but later it proposed 
changes in the selection of the ICS judges. Currently, it can be seen that these changes 
have not been made. Therefore Poland’s attempts to influence the agreement’s clauses 
was not successful. That could be one of the reasons a complete ratification of the 
agreement has still not taken place.        
 In the cases of Spain and the UK there has not been any turning points in 
governments’ position. Although there was strong opposition from different sides, in the 
case of Spain the government’s stance stayed the same. The Parliament has 
consequently ratified the agreement so that it could come into force. In the case of the 
UK, of course, it was important that government was blamed for the diplomatic support, 
with no actions. Whenever others made changes the UK claimed its support for 
successful developments and changes stating that it is in the interests of the UK. For the 
UK now important is Brexit, which also affects the CETA ratification. If it manages to 
ratify before it leaves the EU some of the clauses will be applicable for 20 years. A 
government truly welcomes the ratification, even though it has said that there is always 
the possibility to negotiate a new agreement. An interesting fact is that CETA has been 
seen as an agreement that could be possible for further EU-UK relations after Brexit. 
Therefore it can be said that Spain and the UK supported overall position of the EU, not 
taking any actions that would change or influence the agreement. But it has to be noted 
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that the UK’s support towards CETA means that it trusts the agent which is, in this case, 
the Commission with its position on CETA.  
Table 4. Member state involvement 
CETA Poland Germany Spain UK Italy France 
Benefits Economic/ 
energy sector 
security 
Economic Economic Economic Economic Economic 
Government 
support  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parliament 
support/ 
opposition 
Parliament 
divided/CET
A legislation 
approved 
Greens 
against/ 
major 
parties 
support 
divided/ 
major 
parties 
support 
Strong 
opposition  
- Strong 
Opposition 
Civil society 
support/ 
opposition 
Opposition Opposition both - - opposition 
Turning 
points in a 
position 
change 
2016 – no 
convincing 
arguments for 
ratification 
2016 – will 
not ratify 
because of 
ISDS 
- - When 
Changes 
in 
labelling 
law 
When 
Presiden-tial 
elections 
Areas of 
dissatisfaction 
ISDS; 
Judge 
selection 
 for ICS 
EU-only 
agreement 
ISDS 
Parliament
-CETA 
against 
people’s 
rights 
ISDS - Environ-
mental 
issues/ 
ISDS 
Result  ISDS 
changed to 
ICS; 
Judge 
selection 
stayed the 
same 
Mixed 
agreement; 
Together 
with France 
proposed to 
Commissio
n changes-
ICS 
- Changed 
under other 
state 
involvement
/ UK mostly 
supportive 
- ICS; 
Action plan 
to be part of 
CETA 
Ratification NA NA  Yes NA 
(Governme
nt wish to 
ratify before 
Brexit) 
NA 
(unknown 
due to the 
labelling 
scandal)  
NA 
(expected in 
2018) 
Source: author’s own elaboration  
Italy showed clear support to CETA during the whole negotiation process. Even 
when other member states wanted to make it into ‘mixed’ agreement, Italy was one of 
the EU countries who supported Commission. But the turning point was 2017 when 
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after negotiations were concluded, Italy’s government had to deal with strong 
opposition from the civil society, therefore it changed its labeling law, stressing the 
importance of Italian farmers and that products thus will be more competitive in 
international market. But at the same time, it undermined EU rules, CETA and as other 
actors claim (including Canada) rules of WTO. There has been no further information 
so far on what is the current Italy’s stance on CETA as well as no development on 
‘labeling conflict’.         
 From all six countries, only Germany and France have shown that it is possible 
for the member states to influence one of the biggest trade agreements the EU have ever 
negotiated. Although, since the beginning both countries have supported the agreement, 
there are two parts of the agreement that the two proposed changes for. First of all, 
before the agreement was finalized France and Germany was not satisfied that the 
agreement would be an ‘EU-only’ agreement. Thus both countries united in opposition 
of the ‘EU-only’ clause and with the support of other member states achieved their aim. 
Trade Commissioner pointed out that due to the political pressure from member states 
CETA was finalized as a ‘mixed’ agreement. The other part where both countries have 
been involved was ISDS clause change. An interesting aspect was that already during 
the negotiations both sides expressed their dissatisfaction, but due to the political 
pressure that agreement had to be finalized both countries stressed that if all the other 
member states want this agreement to be finalized they will not stay in the way. 
Considering that still, it was in both country preferences to secure their interests they 
united to approach the Commission for ISDS clause changes. Negotiation re-opening 
was not possible, but Canadian and EU side re-talked the ISDS clause, and informed on 
clarifications the EU member states, after being ready to finalize the agreement. Canada 
has even thanked Germany for its leadership and involvement in the negotiations. 
Additionally France has shown that it is possible to be involved in the nature changing 
of the agreement after its conclusion and when parts of the agreement are already in 
provisional application. It has proposed an action plan on environmental security and 
has claimed that it already have a joint declaration with Canada on this matter. This 
action of course looks like more politically driven, but it affects both the agreement and 
the Commission’s autonomy in its competence area. Nevertheless, there still has to be 
approval from the EU and its member states, and this proposal has not come into force 
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yet.           
 Using CETA case, it can be concluded that member state involvement and 
influence in the EU common commercial policy can be divided into four stages. In the 
beginning of the international trade agreement negotiations they approve the mandate to 
the Commission and gives full support to the agreement, therefore as claimed in the 
theoretical part of this thesis Commission enjoys independence from the member states 
in the negotiations. The support has been expressed as well as during the negotiation 
stages and Commission has not been influenced. When negotiation mandate has been 
made public the pressure to the government comes from domestic actors – parliament 
and civil society. Therefore, governments are responsible that their preferences have 
been secured. Then in this “third” stage before the negotiations has been finalized 
governments start to engage in the work of Commission, as their interests at this point 
are not in the line with each other. No clear “agency slack” in a form of “shirking” 
(diverging) from the mandate has been observed during the CETA. At the same time 
agreements finalization as ‘EU-only’ or ‘mixed’ was a clear point that interests of both 
sides diverged and “agency slack” was observed. It was observed as well that at this 
stage member states want to change whole agreements’ clause, claiming that it is not in 
the line of their interests. Question for further analysis could be – why the member 
states did not get involved during the negotiation stages taking into account that they 
have been informed throughout the negotiations? Further in the fourth stage – period 
after negotiations – the member states want to be involved even now in the area where 
the Commission has its full competence by bringing new proposals to a concluded 
agreement. All these actions throughout the CETA negotiation process and after 
definitely are questioning the role of the Commission in its exclusive competence area, 
but confirms the liberal intergovernmentalist claim that member states are the key actors 
in decision making.  
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Conclusion 
After the analysis of the involvement of the six biggest EU member states in the 
case of CETA negotiations it can be concluded that member states influence the 
international trade agreement process. It can be seen through looking at four stages of 
the negotiation process – beginning, throughout, before and after the finalization. The 
Analysis of CETA agreement negotiations showed that at the beginning and throughout 
the negotiation process, member states expressed full support for the agreement, based 
on economic and even energy sector security interests, giving the Commission full 
autonomy on the negotiation process. It confirms the claim of liberal 
intergovernmentalism that member state domestic preferences are economically driven. 
Also, analysis showed that member states are united as they after all, support the 
Commission and other member state proposal. But they diverge in how active they are. 
For some it is easier if other member states do it on behalf of them, and they express 
their support as it is in line with their country’s interests. Others use the fact that they 
are the largest member states and can unite to combine the ideas to change the 
agreement on behalf of their interests. CETA case confirmed the role of bargaining 
power. For example, even though Poland is a large member state their desired changes 
in the agreement were not made. But cases of Germany and France proved that 
resources and political pressure from the largest member states can influence the final 
outcome of the agreement.         
 Example of CETA demonstrated that due to the growing strong domestic 
opposition (including the Parliament and civil society) in several countries member state 
governments had expressed their dissatisfaction with the overall agreement and certain 
clauses. Large member states took control of the process, focusing on the question of 
the nature of the agreement by uniting their interests, proving and convincing the 
Commission that it has to be a ‘mixed’ agreement.  For ‘mixed’ agreement 
responsibility is shared between EU institutions and its member states, therefore the EU 
requires the ratification of all EU member states. Changes were also made in the 
investment and state dispute settlement clause by uniting the positions of large member 
states and making the Commission to change the clause. The crucial aspect was that 
even Canadian prime minister praised Germany’s positive involvement during the 
negotiations, while pointing out that Commission should nevertheless be in charge of 
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the whole negotiation process. In the period after the negotiations, France has shown 
that it is still possible to make changes in the agreement. France has proposed a new 
action plan for CETA on environmental issues. As it is a new action plan, it is not 
possible to see the results yet, but, it has definitely been moved to the bargaining stage 
now and will next approved by the EU, all the member states, and Canada.  
 The overall conclusion is that member states involvement in CETA negotiations 
meet the expectations of the framework of liberal intergovernmentalism. Framework 
claimed that member states have issue-specific interests. CETA negotiations proved it 
right. Member states did not reject the overall agreement, but changes due to their 
interests were made on specific clauses. The civil society and the Parliament influenced 
the preference making. Strong debates between member states were not observed during 
the bargaining stage. More it showed that overall bargaining power is important to make 
the changes in the agreement. Even though the member states were involved in CETA 
negotiation process, the Commission is the institution that implements decisions of the 
member states and act on behalf of them.      
 Case of CETA proved that the Commission enjoys almost full independence in 
the international agreement negotiation process. But when member state interests are at 
stake and diverge from Commission, then the Commission has been more controlled. 
Theoretical part set a question – if the interests diverge between the Commission and 
member states, how then member states control and influence the further work in 
negotiations. CETA case showed that large member states are ready to be involved the 
Commission’s work by political pressure and new proposals for changes in the 
agreement.           
 CETA case proves that large member states truly can influence the area of 
competence where they theoretically do not have a say. Member states express their 
preferences, discuss and unite with other member states and make the Commission to 
change its previous decisions. The level of influence depends on the domestic situation, 
governments’ stance, and national interests. All of the large countries support the 
possibility for the EU’s and their country economic growth which could be possible 
after the conclusion of the international trade agreement. But when it comes to national 
interests, they do their best to secure them, even if it is not in their competence area in 
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the EU. Thus this thesis has proven that member states on certain stages influence the 
EU international trade agreement negotiation process.   
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